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SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES

No 7, July 1990

Socialism at the End of the 20th Century

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[Article by Ivan Ivanovich Antonovich, doctor of philosophical sciences and prorector of the Academy of Social Sciences Under the CPSU Central Committee. He is the author of a number of books on the history of Western sociology. Our journal has published his article "Sociodynamics of Power" (No 4, 1989)]

[Text] We today are living in one of the most dramatic periods of human history. It has been marked by the processes of profound revolutionary changes encompassing the socialist world and having a serious impact on the sociopolitical life of the entire planet. Old socialism is dying away, a new one is being born in great travail and most likely it will be largely different from the former and in some areas completely replaced by "nonsocialism," or by a more or less categorical denial of the socialist forms of social organization.

"Nonsocialism," of course, is perhaps not the best and most precise term for designating such a completely possible turn of events, however it must be considered that the current sociohistorical situation in Eastern Europe which is still in the becoming stage, when some structures and relations are being disassembled and others are just arising, and when unexpected, complex and dynamic events are unfolding, as yet does not make it possible to predict with sufficient certainty the basic directions of development in this region or exhaustively define its content. These major changes are directly or indirectly linked to perestroika in the USSR. Many of them have occurred contrary to the desire of the leadership of the socialist countries, without any preliminary preparation and upon the will of popular uprisings. The emotions and passions will die down and then the time will come for a profound analysis of the entire spectrum of the social trends appearing here.

But let us turn to our country. As any revolutionary renewal, perestroika in our country has given rise to a number of processes which could not have been predicted.

The objective need for changes in all aspects of socio-economic, cultural, political and spiritual life, in being recognized first by the superior party echelon, as an idea has commenced its march from the top downwards, from the leading center to the mass of workers. As the "reinforced concrete" dogmatism of the social system has become apparent along with its sluggishness for change, mass initiative, now moving from the bottom upwards, has substantially altered the accents of perestroika and has injected a radicalism into the movement, although it has been unable to achieve noticeable

successes. Everyone is demand decisive action and complaining that up to now there has not been a sufficiently integrated and all-encompassing concept capable of leading them to a dependable and stable footing. Social thought, as before, is concerned with working out the most acute definitions of our transgressions in the past, but the question is to create a profoundly thought-out plan for real, constructive activity at present and in the future. The political struggle accompanying this theoretical uncertainty at times degenerates into the posing of selfish interests, forgetting the need for a joint search for effective means for restructuring society. The ideological and theoretical splitting of the programs and platforms of renewal more and more concerns both its supporters and opponents [1, 2].

When the party stated at the very beginning of perestroika that it saw in it the continuation of the cause of October, then this, this continuation, was presented not as a historically linear reproduction or reinforcing on a different social basis of the previously established political, ideological-theoretical and economic principles. It was expressed as an attempt to formulate new social realities which differed from those which existed previously but derived from the very logic of October, from the sense and spirit, from the socially transforming actions and aspirations inherent to it and from the socialist ideal.

Later on, sometime in the third year of the renewal processes, the unforeseen happened. The very formula of perestroika, as continuing the cause of the Bolsheviks, contrary to the initial conceptions, the course and scope of the fundamental changes, assumed a prognostic and perhaps even a prophetic aspect, designating not only a recognition of the need to restore the successive revolutionary ties which at one time were broken by the extreme, extremal methods of building our society, but also a categorical refutation of the entire period of socialism which had been deformed by the clutches of the administrative-command system. The intensity with which subsequently the social structures in the fraternal socialist countries rose up in arms against such a system which had also taken root there and the speed at which this was so quickly destroyed by them eloquently bespeak its shallow, social, cultural and historical roots. For a long time, the system had existed as a clay-footed monolith without dependable base supports and which was condemned to fall from the very first serious shove from below. In the West they immediately began speaking about the "historical failure" of communism [3-5].

The events which are occurring in the socialist world illuminate many of the new circumstances which have negatively influenced its fate. Did this show a "failure" or, on the contrary, the historical ability of socialism to break out of the dying bureaucratic confines to a new, vital pace of development—this must be decided by history. For now, it is becoming clear that for eliminating administrative-command management society had still

not put down strong organizational and social foundations and relying on which it would be possible to initiate positive, creative and specifically socialist work. This, in my view, explains the drama which has accompanied the social changes, that is, the absence of any substantial materialized results and the ongoing deterioration in the situation in various spheres of socioeconomic life. The "bad" social models are not replaced automatically by "good ones." Both of these come into being over a protracted historical evolution. At the same time, the mass demand for quick changes derives, so it seems, from a false premise of social conscience that it is enough to have a program of actions and it will put the social forces in their places, mobilizing all for concrete deeds. This premise is one of the persistent theoretical prejudices which has continued to maintain its influence.

Over the decades, the apparatus has introduced into social life constantly new programs, being little concerned for their conformity to the real situations. This contributed to a gradual overstating or ideologization of the aims of the program and the turning of them into a source of apologetics for the "ongoing self-improvement" of socialism, into a means of demonstrating the steadily changing stages of its development. As a result, they lost any relationship to social reality and since they could not be realized (and the authors themselves of these projects were not interested in this) but it was impossible to escape from them, in society there arose a grotesquely large mechanism of simulating reality: the social structures, along the steps of the hierarchy from the bottom upwards, reported on the carrying out of each such program, while actually moving in the previous mode and according to the previous guidelines, while from the top downwards the next doctrinaire schemes were released, in understanding quite clearly that many of the previous ones had remained unfulfilled. An atmosphere of reciprocal lies and deception became the predominant one and the main trait here was an all-penetrating immorality which discredited the intellect and stunned the mind, honor and conscience.

At present, it is a question of a quantitative transformation in the fundamentals of material and spiritual production and all social relations and this would make it possible to carry out a transition from a society of organized nonfreedom to a society of personal liberty and initiative. The irrationalism of the creation of the social myth is profoundly hostile to this process regardless of whether it is formulated in ideological postulates, general state programs or the value orientations of ordinary consciousness. Here lies the moral essence of perestroika, its sociopolitical and moral-ethical definiteness. In history, such a change from false practices and the fettering of thought to a positive ideal by peaceful means has never yet happened to anyone. In truth, even for us far from everything is going well in this sense.

The ongoing deterioration in the basic measurements of socioeconomic life disappoints all strata of the population. It is no accident that optimism and the hope for a

change for the better have been replaced in some by a mistrust in their own forces and by an ubiquitous spread of pessimistic attitudes. The radical impatience, the energy in the desire to gain for oneself better conditions for distribution instead of increasing one's own contribution to social production, like the lack of clarity in the basic socioeconomic guidelines are unacceptable for creative work. They entail the acute danger of a degeneration of the humanistic ideals of perestroika. Incidentally, foreign colleagues [6-7] have warned us about this. Soviet social sciences have shamefully skirted the arising problems and have ceded the field of research to the emotional conjecture of the journalists.

There must be an immediate and thorough sociological analysis of the existing situation, but this can be based solely on a clear understanding of the tasks a solution to which presupposes gradual, ongoing movement along all the basic social azimuths and an awareness of the need to check our every step with the previously calculated programs. A unified program of cardinal changes is indispensable. Otherwise, sooner or later, all efforts will be in vain. At present, it is not merely an issue of the theoretical balance in the programs but also their correlation with the real sociopolitical conditions, the value orientations, the needs of the real individuals, social groups and classes and with the diversity of clashing, more often polar interests. Possibly, the entire misfortune lies in the fact that perestroika began without a sufficient scientific support. But the very great demand for changes simply did not leave time to wait for theoretical studies. Moreover, as it was to turn out, no paradigm could provide for the depth and scope of pending changes.

As soon as the nation had commenced on perestroika and breaking with the authoritarian-bureaucratic system, it became particularly apparent how much in the socialist society was based upon force and voluntarism and survived in defiance of the aspirations and interests of the citizens, the vital experience and labor of whom had created socialism. An ignoring of the objective social patterns, the rational and moral advisability is a direct inheritance of Stalinism. It is an expression of its major geopolitical error which is that after World War II in the Eastern European nations a model of society was consistently implanted absolutely identical to the one which had been embodied in the Soviet Union. Its formalistic, bureaucratically suppressive, voluntaristically inexorable character was deaf, indifferent and even hostile to the concrete historical conditions in the development of these countries, to their national cultural uniqueness and original traditions.

The tragedy of real socialism was that it did not know and even up to our own days does not know any other forms of historical existence except the administrative-command. This has created a serious threat to the survival of the new system in the world. In any event, precisely this circumstance has caused the profound crisis being experienced by it. At present, the situation is such that together with the abandoning of the discredited

principles of the overcentralized leadership of society, the peoples in the Eastern European socialist states are beginning to express valid mistrust in the ability of the communist parties to carry out positive social changes. As was assumed in the course of the preliminary sociological research [8] the results of free elections on a multiparty basis reinforced the new relationship of the political forces. The communists and the leftists are now in the opposition, possessing a small number of seats in the parliaments.

We feel that along with the subjective reasons for the stagnation of society as these arose in the 1970s in the USSR and were exported to virtually all the socialist countries, there are also objective ones which it is important to analyze seriously. These are first of all the sociopolitical and historical trends which determined such a long triumph of Stalinism and the very fact that it was possible everywhere to impose the administrative-command methods as the only acceptable ones in managing state affairs. Since socialism was established almost everywhere on nothing like the maximum favorable socioeconomic basis which had been envisaged by the teachings of the founders of Marxism, it was unable to develop its historical advantages. Some for these reasons are now beginning to doubt that these advantages are in any way inherent to it. And it is difficult to argue against the doubters, because as the advantages were not demonstrated, their historical feasibility was very difficult to prove.

The immaturity of the productive forces and the low development of the socioeconomic conditions in the countries where socialism was being built left genetic defects in its economic functioning and as a consequence of these it was unable to fully realize itself but rather did so in a truncated manner, as a society of insufficient productivity in contrast to capitalism which was developing as a society of surplus productivity.

In no socialist country was it in any way possible in an adequate form to satisfy material and spiritual needs. In this regard, none of them was capable of approaching average world indicators. The slowly increasing industrial potential was not accompanied by any such improvement in the consumption sphere. The chronic commodity deficit contributed to the growth of rigorism in distribution. Socialism maintained the principle of distribution according to labor, but in an atmosphere of a universal deficit the right to determine the measure of labor was usurped by the bureaucratic elite which created a hierarchical structure through which, regardless of the shortage of resources, it provided itself with the maximum possible gratification of needs. The lot of the masses was a minimal, gradually declining volume of goods and services and which engendered in society a monstrous imbalance in the poles of the quality of life and this fostered a moral decline, a pessimism and mistrust of the people in social justice.

As yet, our perestroyka is unable to break this mechanism as it has not brought about a sharp rise in social

productivity. While, according to Lenin, labor productivity is the main thing, we must add that with the irresolution of the problem of its sharp rise the entire program of perestroyka is doomed to failure. The slow rise in the rates of productivity in all spheres of activity is proof that the economic flaws internally inherent to modern socialism have not been overcome. The system which styled itself socialist was unable to carry out its basic historical mission and hence its collapse. This is not only its fault but also its misfortune.

The socialist revolutions came about not according to the rules assigned to them by Marxist theory, but rather under conditions where the communist parties were given a real political chance to take power in their own hands. Certainly in Russia in 1917 and in the Eastern European countries in the mid-1940s, the revolutionaries acted differently. The Bolsheviks took power as a result of the overthrow of the Provisional Government by the October coup and then by the legitimization of this coup during the years of the Civil War which split all society in two—into the Reds and Whites—and in the harsh crucible of which the former supported by the broad masses of workers gained the upper hand over the latter. But the communists in the Eastern European countries came to the helm of the state with the aid of the Soviet Union and its army which had defeated Nazi Germany. And this caused a different character of the victory of the people's order without the splitting of society into two hostile camps and without the fratricidal class battles. This caused an uniqueness, a certain, so to speak, unevenness and inconsistency in the sociopolitical processes.

Certain researchers are inclined to completely deny the very occurrence of the revolutions in these countries as such. This question probably merits a separate discussion. But I cannot help but immediately emphasize my position: the depth of the socioeconomic and political changes carried out here undoubtedly requires their recognition as revolutionary. They changed the social appearance of the region beyond recognition. It is a different matter that many of the tasks advanced by the communists in the restructuring of society were not to be realized. And hence the action of repudiation of the orders which came into being in recent years.

However, is it possible at present to blame the communist parties in the socialist world for the fact that they assumed the burden of political leadership? I am convinced that this cannot be done. The parties of the working class were created in order for the sake of the practical embodiment of the noble ideals of mankind to strive for leadership over society. We must analyze something else impartially and honestly: why, regardless of all the sacrifices suffered in the course of the struggle for a worthy life of the working people, it was not possible to achieve the real realization of the set goals.

If the communist parties in the Eastern European states and the Soviet Union should be ashamed of anything, then this is for the period of "mediocrity" when, by

bureaucratic tricks and by the will of the ruling administrative elite, the paths were opened up for establishing the authoritarianism of mediocre individuals, when the recruitment of the best of the best actually halted, and when over the decades leaders were promoted only through the apparatus merry-go-round; emerging in the forefront were the accommodators who skillfully fawned upon the superior powers but did not have their own independent political personality.

These aggressive mediocrities appropriated power, actually taking it away from the party for satisfying personal ambitions and being sullied in embezzlement of state property, extortion, drunkenness, nepotism and favoritism. The fault of the parties was that they weakened their political structure, their link with the masses, organization, unity and purposefulness to an extreme degree, having permitted the uncontrolled voluntaristic forces to have free rein. Unfortunately, the moral-psychological and intellectual level of the milieu called communist was below that which characterized the opponents from the bourgeois and social democratic parties. The hypertrophied, mechanically and artificially increased numbers in the communist ranks made them an amorphous formation incapable of political action and influence. This left the leading party nucleus without control. It degenerated from the bearer of historical responsibility into a group of power seekers who wanted above all to preserve their personal power forever.

The communist parties paid dearly for what happened as they lost authority in the eyes of the workers. They must drain the bitter draft to the bottom, preparing possibly for an extended stay in the opposition.

The stagnation of socialism expressed in the actual halting of the processes of progressive social changes became, so to speak, a time of casting stones and this significantly undermined its reputation in the world. Now the time has come to pick up the stones.

Let us assess the current reality. Facts leave no doubt that socialism has created social structures which, in spite of all the experienced shocks, are sufficiently stable and are capable of ensuring its existence on the historical scene. For instance, it seems scarcely likely that economic and sociopolitical demand will impel the new leadership of the socialist countries to completely disassemble public ownership of the means of production. There can be no doubt about it, in the place of the unitary command-administrative system of state ownership of the means of production most likely there will grow up a polymorphous, multilevel model of ownership permitting various types including private, personal, cooperative and state. At the same time, the social practices of the recent past, in upsetting many forecasts, has shown that public ownership of the means of production can really survive as a basis of economic relations. The first attempts to denationalize a series of production sectors, for example, in Poland encountered rather stubborn resistance from the public. The very

dominance of public ownership of the means of production is now perceived by many economists and sociologists in Eastern Europe as an obvious and effective factor [9]. Here they see an opportunity for definite stabilization of the social economic and political structures in the future not only in the sphere of production but also distribution.

In a word, it is not to be excluded that socialism, having discarded the administrative-command system, will return to its authentic, natural and reasonable roots and subsequently each nation will express itself in full consideration of its diversity, contradictoriness and individual uniqueness. Life has repudiated the ideologized postulate which proceeded from the inevitability of the replacement of capitalism by socialism on a world scale. And this has given rise in the world to a more favorable political atmosphere for the establishment and development of a new society under modern historical conditions. In restoring the age-old natural historical bases, socialism must win the confidence of the peoples anew or, to put it more precisely, gain this for the first time. For previously it did not want to achieve this and did not know how.

Up to now, the edifice of socialism has been erected following the principle of from theory to reality. Much was accomplished but this led at even the early stages of its construction to the ossification of theory itself and to turning it into the ideology of apologetics. Now the theory must be renewed on the basis of the real state of socialism and the crisis being experienced by it, that is, it must follow the reverse path from reality to theory and clarify our value orientations from the viewpoint of the needs and hopes of millions of people.

Such a clarification, we feel, can come about within the conceptual frameworks of a formula which brings together the social mechanisms of surplus production and incomplete distribution elaborated by capitalism with the political, ideological and moral mechanisms of social justice created by real socialism but not always provided with sufficient social productivity.

Here we have in mind not the idea of convergence in the form that it was put into theoretical circulation by bourgeois ideologists in the 1960s and 1970s and who envisaged a tendency for the absorption of one system by another, of socialism by capitalism. The latter is not capable now of absorbing socialism without overtaxing its own socioeconomic and organizational underpinnings. The reverse process is also impossible. All the more as the very attempt at a mutual absorption is fraught with a nuclear conflict which has been decisively repudiated by the peoples. It is rather a question of an unusual historical synthesis conceived of not as the fruit of the tyranny of individual sociopolitical circles and parties, but rather the result of a protracted social evolution in the process of which the fundamental interests which bring the world community together gain

superiority over class interests and the forming of an optimum model for a future social organization under this dominant sign.

In describing the historical prospects of the new social order, M.S. Gorbachev in the article "The Socialist Idea and Revolutionary Perestroyka" speaks about an incipient common-civilization direction to the changes occurring in the world. "...This provides grounds to assume," he emphasizes, "that in maintaining their particular features, various social systems will develop within the framework to an ever-greater degree limited by the priority of common human values such as peace, security, freedom, and the opportunity for each people to define its own fate. The world of socialism as well is moving toward the common goals for all mankind within the framework of a single civilization, without abandoning its own values and priorities but rather constantly developing and improving them on the path of revolutionary perestroyka and building a truly human society upon principles of reason and humanism" [10].

Yes, under conditions where socialism and capitalism do not oppose one another in trying to achieve an unilateral advantage, it is possible only to have such a synthetic approach which eliminates the essential opposition between them and realizes the historic gains which provide their joint existence. There is no other path to a qualitatively new social state. Precisely it is capable of leading the peoples to such a stage of collaboration where all aspects of life gain a special significance and will mutually supplement and balance one another. The elaboration of this polyvariant, multilevel global construction of common human interaction will become the response of theoretical thought to the challenges of history at the end of the 20th Century.

At present, it is difficult to predict all of the possible turns in sociohistorical development. There simply is not enough of a data base for detailing the initial theoretical conclusions. But it is essential to study the modern world in all its varieties without overlooking either the capitalist, the socialist or the developing worlds. There must be a social portrait of the planet and this can be obtained due to sociological, sociophilosophical, economic and political research on the main realities of our age.

Only on this basis is it possible to create a program for the gradual elimination of the most acute problems of mankind in the ecological, economic and political areas. However, it is perfectly apparent that not everything in the foreseeable future will be ideal and nothing is to be taken as a given for, let me repeat, history works out its own best variations in the course of a very extended evolutionary development taking entire centuries. Revolutionary transformation activities in many ways manifests, corrects, accelerates and even halts this process, at times changing the channel of historical development, for only motion is inexorable and eternal.

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Simplification—A Sign of the Times?

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[Article by Nataliya Nikitichna Kozlova, candidate of philosophical sciences and senior science associate at the Philosophy Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences. This is the first time she appears in our journal]

[Text] The search for the social and historical roots of Stalinist totalitarianism is at present the concern of both professionals as well as those who are merely endeavoring to analyze and understand them. It has become clear that if this difficult job is not done, we cannot be guaranteed against repetitions. Nor can one doubt the key importance of studying the economic, social and spiritual processes of the 1920s. This was the "pot" in which the future Stalinist society was cooked up.

In endeavoring to understand what happened with our society, each person will follow his own path. For the person concerned with theoretical research, a most important aspect is a critical repudiation of the picture created by the "scientific ideology." The latter claimed to explain the social world "completely" once and for all, but was incapable of constructing an adequate model of Soviet society. Instead, it offered normative images of socialism which then were subjected to ontologization.

This ideal mythological reality created a solid barrier separating the research and reality. Reality in a way escaped from the followers of the "only true and all-powerful"! Without destroying the curtain of the quasi-scientific methods of thinking, it is impossible to break through to the realities.

The destruction of the obsolete picture of the world can be carried out by various methods. This is not only the abandoning of the supposedly ordered, self-contained theoretical systems and the constructing of open systems, but also the metaphorization of cognition aimed at seeking out new reference points in constructing a theoretical picture of reality. Hence, the current popularity of the news reporting genres. The search also requires turning to an analysis of the signposts of our age, that is, the generally accepted rules of the game, the key words of the social lexicon and so forth—everything that serves as an expression and symptom of the state and trends in society's development.

It was precisely such a view as the supertask that the author followed in working into the atmosphere of the 1920s. In particular, we would like to draw attention to one detail which could be pointed out only now, when both society and people had actually changed. What was this particular feature? In the world of the yellowed pages of books and magazines one is struck by the word "simplification." And this often stood next to "class approach." In the process of working with the text, the conviction grew that "simplification" was not merely one of the key words of the social lexicon but also an informative and stylistic characteristic of the age relating to all areas in the activity of the aborning society.

The impression is formed that this process encompassed social life as a whole with the desire to simplify everything, from science to spelling. The rationalization of production, education, everyday and private life about which so much was said then was understood as the reduction of life to a common denominator, as the "fitting of human material" to new methods of organization. The colossal human mass was to be "passed through giant laboratories," millions were to undergo "training and all adult mankind was to be instructed, having created a cultural and labor 'Doctor More's island' from the earth" [1].

A. Goltsman was not alone in his dreams. A. Bogdanov felt that the methods of instruction and exposition existing in a bourgeois society and the unusual form for the "man from the lower reaches" merely exacerbated the gap between the scientists and workers: "The working class needs a proletarian science. And this means a science perceived, comprehended and expounded from its class viewpoint and capable of directing the fulfillment of its vital tasks" [2]. Here simplified knowledge was to be a force in the class struggle.

Even the idea of simplifying orthography was discussed from the viewpoint of class values. "A study of the

orthography left to the Russian proletariat by its class enemies...costs the proletarian state a very great deal and takes away billions of hours from the workers on senseless work related to correct spelling.... Broad circles of the Soviet public...have demanded a reform in it which would make orthography completely acceptable to the strata of semiliterate who are the most backward in cultural terms" [3].

It would be possible to give many such texts where simplification is the key word. The "simplification of culture was viewed by a majority of the leftist theorists as an exceptionally positive result of the revolutionary changes. Here, for example, is the viewpoint of the journalist M. Levidov who was close to the Lef [Leftist Art Front]: having destroyed, similar to the old state machine, the old art, the revolution would create a new by organized simplification. "This simplification is the greatest victory, true progress, a tested and dependable plus sign" [4].

What were the sources of such a tendency? Was it completely imposed and "organized," as some propose? I feel that we must not shut our eyes to the objective preconditions for its rise. The ideas of simplification voiced by the then theorists and writers were based on a significant lower-classes tendency. They were the product of a real and extremely painful split of the old Russian society into people "who did not know the multiplication table" and the people who "doubted" it (N. Berdyayev). The former and the latter were the "they" and "us," while between lay a zone of social alienation. This forced the lower classes to dream about their own culture which was not alien from them but created by them, comprehensible and hence "simple."

In analyzing the development of trends in the postwar [World War I] society, we cannot help but consider the tectonic shifts in social structure which turned society into a plastic material for new forms. In the historically shortest period, the previously existing social fabric was destroyed and in its place there arose a new fabric partially woven out of the old material. The industrialists and merchants, the trades people and the creative intelligentsia basically left the nation. The proletariat and the peasantry held the dominant position in society. For the first time, they felt themselves to be the masters of the nation and this they viewed as the most advanced nation in the world. The peasantry became equal in their level and were turned into middle peasants. It was precisely the peasantry which filled out the decreasing ranks of the working class. Workers and white collar personnel became the most significant groups of the urban population and their ranks were filled out by the lower officialdom of old Russia. The Civil War altered the composition of the working class, a portion of which perished in the fighting, a portion left for the administrative apparatus while a portion became *declassé* and established themselves in the countryside. In the city the *declassé* strata held a larger place than before in the social structure as the masters had left and the servants remained. Harm was also caused to the cultured layer

represented chiefly by the "bourgeois specialists." The demographic structure of society changed substantially with a significant increase in the share of youth. A significant portion of the population did not return from the war and a new generation took its place. They no longer remembered the old Russia while the concepts "Komsomol" and "party line" had been familiar since childhood and "tsar," "general," "constable," "manufacturer" and "landowner" now seemed distant if not even mythical figures. The result of these changes was a simplification in the structure of society which became more homogeneous and this served as one of the preconditions for the trend being examined here.

The processes of the change in the city social structure has been often characterized as "peasantization." But the people who inhabited the cities were rather the "depeasantized" and "deworkerized" who had been uprooted from their old way of life. On the ruins of the former social structures, there appeared many "persons on the boundary line" and they were no longer peasants but had not yet become workers. However, they comprised the "mass" which was to build the "foundation pit." The process of the restructuring of society as it was deprived the classes of their form and this subsequently created a free field for the unlimited growth of statist principles. A role was also played by the pace of the changes. The most important objective source of marginalization was the condensing of various sorts of restructurings in a time when things which would have taken decades were done in years [5].

There is no doubt that in old Russia the people were a convenient soil for a despotic regime. However, the political despotism did not encompass all society from the bottom to the top. In being combined with willpower and breadth, a diversity of mores and styles of life as well as a sort of preference provided by the absence of a suppressive normativism (which did exist under the Stalinist regime), the old society was diverse, rich but in no way *not simple*.

Vitally important functions in it were performed by an influential stratum of the intelligentsia which with the alienation of the masses from political life and culture acted as the bearer of common human values and universal principles. These functions were to be irreplaceable when in the process of industrialization the organic popular culture was destroyed. The stratum of the intelligentsia had the opportunity for self-expression in the press, it influenced both public opinion and the authorities. It is important that this was the only social group for whom freedom was a value. The subsequently occurring physical destruction of a portion of the intelligentsia and the complete depriving of its social influence were to have lethal results.

Equally profound changes were also occurring in culture. Entering the process of postrevolutionary modernization were persons a significant portion of whom had lived still under the personal type of social ties characteristic

of the preindustrial societies. In the forefront were the masses of the illiterate who lived in a world of oral culture. Such a result was probably inevitable and natural but the consequences of this cannot help but be considered in analyzing the sociocultural history of Soviet society. The persons of the old culture who took part in the educational campaigns of the 1920s felt the clear change of cultural paradigms. L.Ya. Ginzburg who at that time was teaching on a rabsak [worker faculty] commented: "It was impossible in a manner which was unnoticeable for culture to provide initial exposure to this entire mass of new people. Culture had been weakened on top because the masses were drawing its juices to themselves. I in no way think that it is necessary and socially useful to simplify, I feel that the decline in cultural quality is not the fault of the government and not the mistake of the intelligentsia, that the decline in quality at the given interval of time is natural" [6]. In reflecting on this phenomenon, she endeavored in a more specific way to characterize the people who differed in their perception of the world from those who had belonged to the old Russian book culture. In comparing the conscience of the old gymnasium [secondary school] graduate with the conscience of a rabsak graduate who was just entering the area of Russian literature, she pointed out: "Literary perception requires either sympathy or a feeling of history. This feeling for history albeit in a very primitive form was found among the prerevolutionary gymnasium graduate. This is not found among the rabsak graduates. Pushkin, Lermontov and Gogol are not only not part of his present culture, but even the potential which he will obtain as is demanded of him by the state" [7].

L.Ya. Ginzburg here is pointing up a most interesting phenomenon, the so-called "fresh man" on the roads of history (he is also a man without history!). Historical experience is not part of his mind but on the other hand this person is devoid of the historical fatigue inherent to the old strata and classes. There is a great sociological, historical and literary tradition which describes the "fresh bourgeois." But there also existed the "fresh proletarian" which, for example, B. Pilnyak wrote about: "If the Russian peasant and the Russian nobleman lived in traditions and a way of life created before them, where they were merely an affirmation of this life, the Russian proletarians at the end of the 19th Century always had to shatter this life, in their finer majority to shatter it in the sake of the better...." [8]. One cannot but help recall also the "fresh intellectuals." It was a question of persons who had not gone through the school of culture, who had just emerged from the "Pyatisobachny lanes" and with exaltation and verve sought out the "printed pages," Lombroso and Haeckel, Kiselev's geometry, some unheard-of, unusual science.... They were not the people but not yet the intelligentsia" [9]. At the time that the intelligentsia, the "elite" was infatuated with A. Blok and V.I. Solovyev, they were interested in vegetarianism, Esperanto and Muller gymnastics. The intelligentsia cultivated skepticism while they were cheerful and full of enthusiasm.

Nation, awake.
Do you hear the call for progress?
It is time for the slave to flower! [Ibid.].—
they call.

On the scale of the multimillion-strong Russia there were not so many "fresh intellectuals." Significantly more widespread was the type of the "completely fresh" man who seemingly emerged from around the corner past which history had flowed for the centuries and whom the winds of revolution had carried to the surface of historical life. This could be the harmless Zoshchenko figure who lived like grass and thought merely about something "concrete," for example, about fruit or liver sausage and the Platonov doubting Makar with his "empty large head" and nimble hands, an obsessed enthusiast of changes and the building of a new life. As one can judge from the earliest works of A. Platonov, he himself at the dawn of his youth appeared as such a man, fresh and simple. Subsequently, in describing his heroes, to a definite degree he drew his own "portrait of the artist as a young man."¹

Thus, these new people are "fresh," illiterate or semiliterate. But certainly illiteracy is not merely the ability to read and write. It is the insufficient development of self-awareness and critical thinking, the predominance of the affective over the reflexive. It is the absence of individuality. Yu.M. Lotman has correctly said that when a person writes a letter or reads a book, he begins to understand himself. In actuality, the combination of a letter with reading makes it possible to go beyond the limits of an uncritical perception of collective experience and provides the individual with the possibility of correlating and comparing various individual experiences and to translate personal conclusions into social ones. Individuality capable of reflection is formed, of course, not merely by the aid of the means of communications but by the entire system of social relations in which a person lives and which comprises the horizon of his consciousness and activity. But, nevertheless, the degree of access to the means of communications has very substantial significance in the shaping of subjectivity.

What happens if a person is illiterate but all the same lives in a society which is in a state of modernization? The predominance of illiterate and semiliterate persons left an impression on the forms of life of postrevolutionary culture. Let us recall the detachment of oral agitators unprecedented in scale and which carried the party word, new culture and new values into the masses.² A large portion of them worked voluntarily and most importantly with "face to face" contact.

The transition from the world of the oral word (or even the world of the letter) to a culture of the press is a sort of crossing of the Rubicon. Its result can be the acquiring of a new, more complex picture of the world but it can also be a simplifying of the existing. Under the conditions of the prevailing in society of traditional type ties and the underdevelopment of the individual principle, the postrevolutionary introduction to literacy had, to put

it mildly, varying consequences. Literacy was mastered largely by those whom Zoshchenko called "indescribable persons" and who prior to the revolution lived like "walking plants" being able only to "creep about and die." In describing the results of the cultural changes, as a rule, they pointed to the elimination of illiteracy. But actually did the people reach the "Gutenberg Galaxy" or did it pass them by? From whence the universal inability to write a letter or draw up a business paper? Why does a large portion of the public write with terrible grammatical errors? They are not very adapted clearly to the "means" of communications as such. For us the printed text is eternal whether it is a fetish or a source of ennui. But the fetishistic attitude toward the printed product was noted, incidentally, by S. Zweig who visited the USSR in the 1920s: "In the student dormitories, Tatars and Mongols came up and grandly showed us their books: 'Darwin,' said one, 'Marx,' repeated another with as much pride as if they had written these books themselves" [11].

In one way or another, as a result of becoming literate, the level of mass culture seemingly rose but the natural result of this process was the "simplifying of culture." The people themselves, being semiliterate, became fine grounds for indoctrination. The Canadian researcher F. Eydlin has pointed out that "the people who in fact are under the sway of the official language are perceived by all as simple-souled and stupid" [12]. But those persons under discussion actually were simple. The real diversity of the world was reduced to extremes: white—black, good—bad, friend—enemy. Society seems a system that is comprehensible, easily explainable and subjected to any changes. Here there is no place for recognition of individuality either of oneself, of someone else or of relations between people. The illusion of omnipotence creates an illusion of omnipotence. One has merely to wish and give the correct order. People believed that the path to happiness was short.

This type of person, as is known, could also be represented in a terrible form. Let us recall the episode from the story "Sofya Petrovna." A typist had made an error and had written "Rat Army" instead of "Red Army." For a cultured person, it would be clear that this was an ordinary erratum. This is how the heroine of the story explained it. They answered back: "You can't argue with documents...rat or ratine—this makes no difference. There has been a class hostile attack by Citizeness Frolenko [13]. An erratum was turned into grounds for a political accusation.

From whence did this evil image arise? Was it merely a question of illiteracy? Or is the "fresh man" by nature a bearer of evil? Precisely the "evil" manifestations of binary consciousness made it possible for L. Gosman and A. Etkind to consider it totalitarian consciousness [14]. Is this the case? Consciousness of this type can be discovered in any society. It has an ancient, archaic origin. The vexing problem of its current fate surfaces as soon as the question arises of the "mass." In contrast to the named researchers, V. Chalikova probably correctly assumes that a totalitarian consciousness simply does

not exist [15]. What is taken for it is the consequence of a situation when a "simple" consciousness begins to act "according to its own rules" in a situation requiring notions of the world as a complex system. It is not a question of the qualities of man and his conscience but rather the situation of modernization as such.

A fatal role for the history of Soviet society has also been played by the fact that the process of simplification occurred not merely "in a natural historical manner" as a result of the spontaneous and contradictory sociocultural development. It was stimulated by an organized system of spiritual production, it had its own inspirers and theorists and was realized from a class viewpoint which was not set by consciousness itself but rather was "introduced" into it by the "scientific ideology" and then reinterpreted in the terms of binary thinking. The theory of class struggle was moved into the communal kitchen. The criteria for selecting persons to be sent to study had exclusively a class nature. The "special mobilizations" for the schools, the rabsfaks, the institutes and the administrative ranks were aimed at "proletarianizing" society. The enthusiasts of the cultural revolution understood it in the most iconoclastic sense, as the overthrowing of the embourgeoised reactionaries and bureaucrats, as the continuation of the October Revolution and Civil War in which many because of their age had not participated. The "cultural front" was defended against bourgeois attacks, the fortresses like the Bolshoy Theater and the Academy of Sciences were stormed and the people's illiteracy eliminated with the aid of "culture armies" and "flying detachments."

As a result, there was a degradation of the universities and many graduates were not even above the secondary school level. Education at best was assigned the role of a Marxist school with a special qualification. Often neither one nor the other turned out. The main thing was to master—once and for all!—the correct principle, the class principle and its application guaranteed success: "The poor peasant is illiterate, he does not know how to read or write but he already knows his class enemies, he—the illiterate—is beginning to move out of the area of gossip and rumors into the area of politics" [16]. The "automatically happened," the done and the inspired were superimposed one on another.

It is impossible not to ask the question of what form Marxism acquired in the consciousness of people who had just become literate. Certainly the tasks set were grandiose! In the opinion of the party historian well known in the 1920s and the popularizer of Marxism, V.A. Nevskiy, "the elimination of illiteracy and semiliteracy under the conditions of Soviet Russia is aimed not at giving purely technical skills of reading, writing and counting but rather the political education of the very broadest masses of the population and involving in political life the workers who had been suppressed in the old times" [17]. This statement is symptomatic. The elimination of illiteracy was viewed not so much as an introduction into Russian and world culture as it was an introduction into politics. But the ideas of Marxist

theory could not be understood by the "simple people" except by ideological slogans which set the matrix for the perception of the social world: "we are not slaves," "we bring freedom to the world" and "the science of Lenin for the peasant and peasant woman" (texts of the primers of those times).

"Freshness" and a thirst for knowledge to an equal degree marked these people. But "class ideology" had for them greater social value than knowledge itself. For example, here is what was written by Prof V.N. Zavodovskiy, in answering in a youth magazine the question "how would you like to see our youth?": "Our youth with every right can be proud of its exceptional maturity in understanding and knowing sociohistorical life and here it, in mastering Marxist analysis, does one better not only in terms of their contemporary but also an adult representative of the bourgeois states" [18]. The professor, of course, was flattering the young people and they, it must be assumed, took this flattery as the real thing. In actuality, it often happened that the people began arguing about the class struggle in France and Germany without being able to point on the map to where these countries were. Understandably, the assimilation of special knowledge again was reduced to mastering ideological slogans such as "God does not exist" and "world revolution is inevitable." The situation was exacerbated by the mistrust in the old pedagogues while the new ones had just begun to be trained in special VUZes.

It must be pointed out that such a social group as the youth during all times has been the bearer of simplifying trends. Each new generation is the "fresh people" in history. Because of their age, the youth do not have social and historical experience or historical memory (if this is not intentionally cultivated). They easily abandon the past for they do not have one. For this reason, they are inclined to seek out facile solutions to the problems of life for they have little room for doubts, they easily accept the ideal reality as the "current one," and a scheme as actual life.

In studying the age, one is constantly amazed just how much ordinary professionalism was not held in honor in any area, in science, at a plant or in peasant labor. Characteristic is the statement of Ye. Preobrazhenskiy about what a rural communist should be: "If he can be an exemplary communist only at the price of being turned into a bad farmer, then this latter outcome must be preferred" [19]. Or the following fragment from the story by V. Pertsov "The City Under the Factory": "The current director was thoroughly investigated in the trust and, finally, was asked whether he understood anything about the textile business. The demobilized soldier fired back: 'No,' and he was immediately appointed the director of the factory school with the words 'this is just what we need'" [20].

Suspicion of anything "former" as bourgeois led to the destruction of common human values. A contradiction

arose between the quantitative growth of cultural institutions and the improbable growth of obscurantism and the attack on anything complex or refined. Oversimplification was also apparent in the fact that any opposing idea was excluded as the world should be whole and noncontradictory! Doubts and criticism were equated with treason. The prophetic antiutopia of "We" by Ye. Zamyatin was viewed as an outright lie and slander, while the "Aelita" of A. Tolstoy was received with raves! Only under such hothouse conditions could the notion arise and flourish about Soviet society as a society without contradictions. And how amazingly "simple" is the text of the "concise course of the history of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)]"?³ In these processes it is not always simple to separate the ill-intentioned from the naive similar to that which allowed the old woman to put the wood on the fire around Jan Hus or from the naive ostrich attitude toward the world defined by the prevalence of an ideology in people for whom the world was simple and comprehensible. If one or another unpleasant phenomenon was not said out loud, then it would disappear by itself and be forgotten. The heroes of Platonov and Bulgakov did not recognize themselves in their texts and rejected both.

The materialism of Marx in practice was "interpreted" in the terms of the consciousness of a semistarving person who dreamed about the redistribution of everything: "The person who had nothing now would have everything." The ideas of socialism assumed a quasireligious character while the ideas of Orthodox Christianity were destroyed along with the churches. People who thought merely about the "concrete" and who lived in a world of simple labor and food considered the higher forms of culture to be something for the nobility. Materialism was refracted in consciousness as a idea of leveling justice, universal dividing up and the rationing of everything even ideas. Of course, there was a difference between the conscience of the workers and the peasantry but the basis of its unity was the unity of hard work over which reigned the ideological power of the new symbols.

What have been the results of the total simplification processes caused by truly a mosaic of factors? The trends described here in culture and society served as an effective prerequisite for simplifying the social linkage itself, its maximum centralization characteristic of the Stalinist totalitarian regime and encompassing private life itself. The rejection of a significant portion of Russian and world culture as "bourgeois" served as a basis for forming that monological style in the social body and the consequences of which society continues to experience even today and this is just now beginning to be recognized. Have the words "common human morality" been used without quotes for a long time?

The old sociality here survived and was unconsciously reproduced. Modernization occurred but under the condition of maintaining personal-type relations. This

linkage, however, was deprived of its former characteristic cultural and stylistic hue and this contributed to its preservation and to turning it into a sort of formal bureaucratic nationality (in truth, in no way reminiscent of the Western type rationality!). New structures arose on the basis of the old types of sociality and the old types of conscience. In endeavoring to analyze the mechanisms and the results of this converting of a social linkage and the very method of uniting people in a society, we cannot help but recognize that it also had the nature of simplification.

Here a personified, personally tinted standard no longer existed. The new formal bureaucratic rationality was an organic element in the extraeconomic system of managing society and this not only did not need developed individuality but, on the contrary, endeavored to eliminate the personal principle. It did not need a living human or a pluralistic society rich in cultural terms.

The result was an inconceivable degree in the atomization of society. The atom individual remained one-on-one with the state, for the mediating structures were destroyed. And the person living under the conditions of the dominance of the administrative-bureaucratic system, without acquiring individuality, was deprived of his sort of "coziness" of existence which prevailed previously in the community. And was not this the source of the possibility of the movements which went back on their word, the eternal marking in place and the desire to "warm up" the social linkage and give a personal nature to a superpersonal standard?

The imposition of power relations on all types of social linkage was the background against which the totalitarian system arose. Social ties as much as possible were "communalized," statified and simplified and reduced to a "center—periphery" linkage.

This result shows how tragic was the response of the immature, phased prerequisites of historical development—economic, social and cultural. The Great October Socialist Revolution conformed to the interests of the basic mass of the nation's population. However, the goals and potential of this revolution were only partially realized. An opponent can argue back. In all justice, life was never like that! And the "fresh" man, A. Platonov, was turned into an inspired writer and generally speaking people were different and not merely "simplified." Science developed and philosophy was not completely killed. High culture did exist, as well as groups which consumed it. The art historian M. Turovskaya recalled the cultural life of the 1930s, describing the cultural cross-section well known to her: "Not to miss the ballet premier, you stood up all night for tickets 'to see Kachalov' or Ostuzhev...or Koonen...there were many other remarkable places where we went constantly. A museum of new Western art...the Tretyakov where they 'still' and not 'already' showed Borisov-Musatov and Somov, Chagall and Malevich. In the summer, there was the Troitse-Sergiyevskaya Monastery (for a certain time there was an antireligious museum there). The

Great Hall of the Conservatory with concerts by Sofronitskiy, Mariya Yudina or Gilels, with touring groups of Kurt Zanderling or Mravinskiy and the first performances of the Shostakovich symphonies" [21].

Actually, society and culture resisted simplification. But everything complex or delicate partially lost ground and partially left for the "catacombs" and the "underground," and became a marginal trend. The persons who were termed marginal, at least in Soviet society, were not such, holding the central position in it [22]. But in one way or another the unsimplified principle lived, otherwise the thaw of the 1960s and the current perestroika would not have been possible.

Now for the last question in number, but certainly not in importance. Is the examined process of simplification unique and inherent only to Soviet society in the designated period? Actually, on the one hand, it is seemingly unique. For precisely this reason, the author by large number of quotes has endeavored to reproduce the unique voice of the age. But we keep on thinking that simplification is a certain universal characteristic which is naturally apparent in an age of radical social changes and in transitional periods. Simplification can become not only a condition for that stalemate situation when, as in our country, the positive traits of "corporateness" (that is, personal type ties) were not used and simultaneously the way was not opened up to the free development of commodity-monetary relations. The result of simplification, as was pointed out above, was a society which was not similar to the old one. But at the same time, this was a society with an inconceivable degree of atomization and the alienation of man from everything: from property, from culture and from himself. Against the background of simplification, as history shows, new societies have been born. At one time the tendency toward simplification as a prerequisite for the birth of a new order was pointed out by A. de Tocqueville. The Great French Revolution, he wrote, in the place of the feudal institutions established a more uniform and simpler political and social order based upon the equality of the estates [23]. And out of this trend there was born a society which totally changed the appearance of Europe and the world.

The tendency toward simplification is an indication of the alternative nature of a situation the outcomes of which can vary. An analysis of the present-day situation in our nation from this viewpoint requires a different place and time. However, it is clear that the current time of radical social changes has also been accompanied by simplifying trends which are visible to the naked eye. This is the noticeable spread of black-and-white thinking and the sway of simplifying ideologies. The disintegration of the administrative-bureaucratic system has also been accompanied by a new atomization and marginalization. Historical experience suggests that not only the final abandonment of totalitarian structures can become the result of escaping from the existing situation but also

a repeat descent into a totalitarian society. Such a danger cannot help but be considered. Although history does not teach anything to anyone....

Footnotes

1. Of extreme interest from this viewpoint is a rereading of his brief comments in 1920, for example, "Learning to Manage," "Culture of the Proletariat," "Reclaiming of the Land" and others [10].
2. One might incidentally ask the question: Is not the current army of social science teachers and lecturers of the Znaniye [Knowledge], the activities of which are clearly useless, the direct heir of the postrevolutionary agitators who worked with such high effectiveness for they were well adapted both to the social structure and to the predominant type of communication?
3. One must admit that this simplicity was attractive for many. At present, in recalling the "old years," they point out that both the academician and the nurse admitted that Lenin was hard to read and you really had to "force your way through," while Stalin wrote simply and clearly.

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Migration Processes in the USSR: New Phenomena

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[Text] Until the 1970s, the survival rate of new settlements was probably the only major migration problem on which the attention of scientists and practical workers was concentrated. Then due to a number of factors, there was a major change in the migration processes. By this time, the return of the population to the European regions had ended and thus the migration waves caused by the war died out. At the same time, in society many social processes began to be heightened covertly and these left an imprint on migration. The migration movement of the population in the USSR, on the one hand, was under the influence of the mechanisms of social inhibition leading to stagnation in society and, on the other, it responded to the benefit systems introduced at that time and the coefficients for new construction projects which were prestigious from the viewpoint of those times but were not so necessary from the standpoint of today and to the decrees adopted by the government for developing agriculture in the Nonchernozem Zone of the nation. In this context, even in the 1970s of stagnation there was a number of positive shifts in the migration movement of the USSR population. Thus, in the second half of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, there was a positive balance of interregional migration of the Siberian population established and the survival rate rose in a number of new settlement territories. There was a decline in the scale and intensity of the loss of population from the villages in the nation's Nonchernozem Zone. In certain Central European oblasts of the RSFSR, where the migration situation in the rural localities was particularly complex and for

many years had been combined with depopulation phenomena, the loss of the rural population in individual years was replaced by a positive migration rise. The nature of interrepublic migration exchange was altered and this was expressed in the fact that the Russian Federation for the first time over the previous 20 years (1956-1975) began to have a migration balance while all the southern republics of the nation—Central Asia and Transcaucasus—at the end of the '70s and the beginning of the '80s began steadily to lose population as a result of migration, particularly in favor of the rapidly developing eastern and central regions of the nation. Simultaneously, the influx of migrants into Central Asia from the central oblasts of the RSFSR and Siberia declined and, beginning in 1975, Siberia had a positive migration increase in the exchange with all Central Asian republics. At the same time, there was an increased territorial mobility in the indigenous rural population in the southern regions of the nation and this was due to the increase there in the scale and intensity of rural-to-city migration [1]. At the same time, these shifts concern only the most general, quantitative migration parameters (its scale, intensity, territorial direction), without touching upon the factors which have brought about the specific migration flows and their structural characteristics (sociodemographic, nationality and other composition of the migrants) as well as the various consequences related to the territorial redistribution of the population in the context of present-day and long-range sociopolitical, economic and demographic development of the nation and its individual regions. For this reason, the designated shifts cannot yet be considered absolutely favorable from the viewpoint of the regional development of the population and fully conforming to the requirements of the national economy for the placement of the population and the labor resource.

Thus, behind the improvement in the migration situation in the RSFSR Nonchernozem Zone stand structural changes in the rural population including its intensive aging. At present, in three regions of the Russian Federation, the Central, Volga-Vyatka and Central Chernozem which comprise the core of the nation's Nonchernozem Zone, there are around 11 million persons residing, or 28 percent of the total rural population of the republic [2]. However, in many oblasts of these regions, the share of the elderly (60 years and over) in the rural population even in 1979 reached 30-33 percent. According to the data of the 1989 Population Census, the situation has been further exacerbated and this naturally could not help but tell on the decline in the overall level of migration activity by the rural population.

At the same time, the research conducted by the Demography Department of the Sociology Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences¹ on the potential migration of the rural population has shown that $\frac{1}{3}$ of the graduates from the rural general education schools and more than $\frac{4}{5}$ of the questioned adult villagers of Volgograd and Kalinin Oblasts did not intend to leave their village and respectively $\frac{2}{3}$ and $\frac{4}{5}$ of them felt that rural life as a whole was better than urban. In this context a decline in the loss from the countryside in

the 1980s can be explained not only by structural changes in the rural population (by the decline in it of the territorially most mobile demographic groups) but also by the process of unique social selection. The given phenomenon as yet has not been investigated and for this reason there must be a special explanation for the sociopsychological mechanisms of shaping the migration behavior of different groups in the rural population.

Behind the externally positive change in the nature of the interrepublic exchange of population as expressed in the positive migration balance of the Russian Federation and the loss of population from the labor-surplus Central Asian Region are concealed profound internal factors which have encouraged an intensive loss out of Central Asia for persons of the nonindigenous nationalities and basically Slavic-speaking. This can be seen from the decline in 1979-1988 of the total number of Russians living in all the Central Asian republics, as well as the Ukrainians in Kirghizia and Turkmenia. In parallel, there has been an intense increase in indigenous nationalities from Central Asia in the Russian Federation. In 1979-1988, the number of Kirghiz and Tajiks here rose by 1.7-fold and Uzbeks and Turkmen by 2.1-2.8-fold in comparison with an Union-wide growth of these nationalities of 1.3-1.4-fold; this shows their intense migration into the Russian Federation. This process also requires profound structural and sociopsychological analysis.

However, research in this area is substantially impeded by the inaccessibility for a broad range of researchers or a total absence of the necessary statistical and sociological information. In particular, for many years (from 1976 through 1988), migration data were not published in the open press and this prevented either the discussion of these problems or an exchange of research results. Moreover, all our migration statistics (be these materials of the censuses or a current count) is very meager. There is no direct statistical information even on such important parameters as, for example, sex-age and nationality, family and educational characteristics of the migrants in combination with the territorial and intersettlement direction of the migration flows.

Incidentally, we would point out that in prerevolutionary Russia there was well organized accounting of the migratory movement. In that period, the flows of settlers to the east were registered at two points, in Syzran and Chelyabinsk. And it was not merely a question that the settlers were given aid along the way but also in parallel a detailed study was made of the migrants. These data were closely used by the zemstvo [local administration] statistics and in the scientific research of those times, including in the works of A.A. Kaufman, N.P. Oganovskiy, N.M. Yadrintsev, I.A. Gurvich, A.D. Poshekhanov and others. The same data are used as the basis for the fundamental conclusions drawn by V.I. Lenin in such works, for example, as "the Development of Capitalism in Russia" and "The Significance of the Settlement Movement" which even now represent models of profound scientific study of the migration problem. In the 1920s, the counting of migrations was further developed. In particular, settlers for Siberia and the Far East underwent an analogous thor-

ough registration in Irkutsk. For this reason, we know significantly more about the sociodemographic, economic and even the reproduction characteristics of the prerevolutionary settlers and the migrants of the 1920s than we do about the present day.

Modern researchers, without excluding direct statistical information, have been forced, on the one hand, to be guided solely by the general quantitative characteristics of the migration flows and not the structural (qualitative) ones and this has impoverished the analysis and at times led to superficial conclusions (this also concerns certain publications by the authors of this article) and, on the other hand, to resort to indirect assessments. The latter are basically founded on the intercensus dynamics of the territorial size of the sociodemographic groups (by sex, age, nationality, and length of residence) and for this reason are rigidly fixed to the date of holding the all-Union population censuses and the time for the subsequent elaboration of their results. Moreover, a number of key migration parameters cannot always be assessed indirectly. Among these are the true number of migrants in the USSR and the annual number of moves in the nation, an any way accurate notion about which can be obtained only by relying simultaneously on the census data (and not all, but those worked out according to a special program) and current migration statistics. The current procedure for counting the migration movement of the population in the USSR and the nonidentical programs for working out the materials of the postwar censuses have made it possible to carry out such a calculation only once, at the beginning of 1970.² A recount will be possible only for the end of the 1980s, after completing the elaboration of the 1989 census results, that is, 19 years later.

According to our estimates, the total size of the migration flow for the USSR as a whole at the beginning of the 1970s

was approximately 14 million events a year [4]. According to the estimates of other authors, this varied from 10 to 16 million [5]. Clearly, such extremes in assessing the amount of the Union-wide migration flow provide only an approximate notion even of the most general level of territorial activeness for the nation's population, let alone its time trend which is equally important. All these examples clearly show that under the conditions of information starvation the researchers are forced to spend precious time on inventing various methods for indirect assessments. As a result, many migration problems are established not in the stage of their genesis, when they have already achieved a certain acuteness, and for this reason their solution begins with a long delay.

Again, we must defer to the future a thorough study of the migration situation which has developed in recent years (1986-1988) as the researchers as before do not possess reliable and detailed information. For now, we need clarification for even the most general results of interregional migration over these years, as the USSR Goskomstat [State Statistics Committee] has still not made corrections in the annual size of the population in the territories over the last intercensus period (1979-1988). If we were to follow the previously published data, there has been a number of new shifts which could be spotted in the mid-'80s in the interrepublic migration exchange. Among these is the sharp rise in the migration losses of Kazakhstan; the markedly increased influx of migrants into the Ukraine, Moldavia and Georgia has been replaced by the loss of population; the number of persons arriving in the Baltics has declined (see Table 1). However, it still cannot be said with certainty just how much this is "playing with figures" and how much real changes in the migration trends.

Table 1. Migration Increase in Population of Union Republics Over 5-Year Periods for 1976-1988*

Union Republics	Migration Increase (1,000 Persons)			Percent of Natural Increase		
	1976-1980	1981-1985	1986-1988	1976-1980	1981-1985	1986-1988
RSFSR	+785	+956	+570	+21.3	+24.1	+20.8
Ukraine	-31	-33	+165	-3.0	-3.7	+30.3
Belorussia	-28	+3	-5	-8.9	+0.9	-2.5
Uzbekistan	-73	-128	-298	-3.6	-5.2	-17.3
Kazakhstan	-332	-320	-356	-27.3	-24.7	41.1
Georgia	-92	-86	+71	-37.9	-34.5	49.3
Azerbaijan	-80	-121	-199	-14.6	-19.3	-47.7
Lithuania	+34	+64	+22	+37.8	+68.4	+33.8
Moldavia	-69	-66	+42	-33.6	-30.3	+27.6
Latvia	+40	+52	+30	+250.0	+167.7	+103.4
Kirghizia	-65	-54	-72	-16.8	-11.9	-23.1
Tajikistan	-31	-37	-40	-5.7	-5.5	-7.9
Armenia	+12	-50	-239	+4.7	-17.6	-149.4
Turkmenia	-22	-41	-29	-6.0	-9.9	-9.9
Estonia	+28	+32	+12	+133.3	+128.0	+63.2

* Calculated according to [6].

The current migration situation in the nation continues to remain rather complex and contradictory. At present, regardless of the drop in intensity, in the central regions of the nation there is an ongoing loss of the rural population leading to a further deformation of its age-sex structure and occurring in a predominant majority of instances against a background of its natural decline. As a whole, over 1979-1988, a negative natural increase was noted in the rural localities of all oblasts of the Central and Central-Chernozem Regions as well as in Gorkiy Oblast. Migration losses in the rural population in this region in a majority of instances have remained higher than the average republic level and in a number of RSFSR oblasts (Tambov, Kursk, Bryansk, Tula, Ryazan, Pskov, Voronezh, Ivanovo, Orel and Penza) and in the Mordovian ASSR these have been combined with a decline in the total number of the population leaving them [7].

As before, the number of the rural population is growing intensely in the southern republics. In the 1980s, in Central Asia the nation's highest increase in rural inhabitants was noted (23-39 percent in 1979-1988) and this exacerbated the already very grave situation in employing the population in rural localities [Ibid., p 99]. Along with this, the new settlers continue to survive poorly in regions of concentrated exploitation of natural resources in the north and east of the nation (the zone of the BAM [Baykal-Amur Mainline], Tyumen Oblast and others). Under the conditions of the intense circulation of the population, migration has a marked influence on the demographic processes. Thus, in the Far Eastern and Western Siberian Regions, the proportional amount of the migration increase in 1979-1988 was 30-40 percent of the corresponding total increase in the size of the population [7, p 101]. In other words, at present, all the

migration problems which existed in the nation at the beginning of the 1980s have not lost their urgency, including: stabilizing the urban population in the Central European regions of the USSR, increasing the survival rate of the new settlers in new development areas and the low territorial mobility of the indigenous rural population in the Central Asian Republics. The elaboration of the materials from the 1989 All-Union Population Census will make it possible to clarify the areas where the designated migration trends have spread in the USSR by the end of the 1980s.³

In the course of perestroyka, a number of new acute migration problems has arisen and these are of great domestic and foreign political significance. Thus, the adoption in 1987 in the USSR of a new law on entry and exit procedures caused a loss to the economically developed nations of our creative intelligentsia and most skilled technical personnel, having created the problem of a so-called "brain drain." In 1973-1989, the number of persons leaving the USSR for permanent residence abroad, according to the data of the USSR MVD, exceeded 750,000 persons, 44 percent of whom (over 330,000) left the nation in 1988-1989. The flow of emigrants from the USSR continues to grow. Just in 1989 alone, some 228,000 Soviet citizens were permitted to leave for permanent residence in other countries and this was 30 percent of all the persons leaving the USSR over the last 17 years (1973-1989) and is 2.1-fold more than the previous year of 1988 [9, No 40, 44]. Leaving the nation are predominantly ethnic Germans, Jews and Armenians and this is an unique response to the poor solution to sociopolitical, economic and ethnic problems in the nation [Ibid., No 36, 40, 44]. The flows of emigrants from the USSR go chiefly to four nations: Israel, West Germany, the United States and Greece (see Table 2).

Table 2. Number of Persons Receiving Permission to Leave the USSR for Other Countries for Permanent Residence, 1989*

Emigrants 1989	Total Emigrants	Including Leaving For			
		Israel	West Germany	USA	Greece
Total number of persons	228,600	Over 102,000	95,700	13,900	Over 10,000
Total number of persons, %	100.0	44.6	41.8	6.1	4.5
Increase in comparison with 1968, times	2.1	3.4	1.8	-1.3	4.8

* Source: [10].

According to the data of the USSR MVD, 83 percent of those leaving for the United States were Armenians, in the past repatriates, while basically ethnic Germans left for West Germany; for Israel it was Jews who later largely migrated to the United States and other countries; ethnic Greeks to Greece [10].

In recent years there has been a sharp increase in Jewish emigration from the USSR. Thus, while in 1986, 900 persons of Jewish nationality left the Soviet Union, in 1988, it was around 19,000 and in the first half of 1989, over 33,000 [9, No 36]. In considering that for the year

1990 the U.S. government has doubled the admission quota from the USSR to 50,000, we can see that the number of direct emigrants to the United States will increase even more. In just October 1989 alone (this is the month when the new fiscal year begins in the United States), the American Consulate in Moscow issued 237,000 applications for persons wishing to travel to the United States [11]. At the same time, since up to now the flow of emigration from the USSR to the United States to a significant degree has been carried out to third countries, including through Israel, and as of this year

the American administration is permitting only a direct entry, in the immediate future this flow will scarcely increase.

The emigration of Soviet Germans has risen sharply, chiefly to West Germany. While in 1985, 5,000 Germans left the Soviet Union for the FRG, in 1987, after the new exit regulations came into force, this number was 16,000 and in 1988, 47,000 [9, No 44]. In 1989, the total number of ethnic Germans leaving the USSR exceeded 105,000. According to the existing estimates, in the next few years their numbers can reach a million and this corresponds to approximately 1/2 of all the Germans currently living in the USSR [11]. The most significant migration losses in this area are found in Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation, particularly Western Siberia, where the basic portion of the nation's German population resides [12].

At the same time, for 11 years now the USSR has been bringing in significant contingents of unskilled manpower from Vietnam and North Korea for working in low-prestige areas of production at a number of USSR industrial enterprises. By the end of 1989, the USSR had over 100,000 foreign workers, including around 90,000 Vietnamese [9, No 45; 13]. Naturally, the combination of these two different-directed flows in international migration (the intensive loss of the most skilled personnel and the moving in of unskilled workers) has led to a deterioration of the nation's labor potential and as a whole has reflected unfavorably on its socioeconomic development. The use of foreign workers has also given rise to a whole series of negative phenomena which have been repeatedly examined in our press. The working and living conditions under which the Vietnamese workers have been forced to endure, for example, at the ZII [Automotive Plant imeni Likhachev] Plant and the Moscow MPShO [Moscow Ball Bearing Plant] have not brought honor to our nation which assumed the obligation of vocational training for the foreign citizens and guaranteed them the rights provided by USSR laws [9, No 45; 13].

In addition, in the migration movement of the USSR population recently a new and fundamentally acute social problem has appeared and this is the problem of refugees. Its rise has been related primarily to the lack of settlement of the interethnic relations under the difficult conditions in the nation of sociopolitical and economic development. This appears both in an open and concealed form. In the open form this is the flows of Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan, the Azeris from the NKAO [Nagornyy Karabakh Autonomous Oblast] and Armenia, the Meskhetian Turks from Fergana Oblast of Uzbekistan—all arising as a consequence of interethnic conflicts. In being directed into different regions of the nation, these flows at present are measured not in tens but hundreds of thousands of people [14]. Thus, the Meskhetian Turks who fled from Fergana Oblast themselves moved or under emergency procedures were sent to the southern oblasts of Kazakhstan (around 5,000 persons), into the RSFSR to Belgorod, Smolensk,

Kalinin and other oblasts (at least 6,000), as well as into Azerbaijan, where by the beginning of November 1989, there were around 40,000 refugees of this nationality (considering the persons who had not remained in other regions of the nation) [14].

According to the data at the end of 1989, some 180,000 Armenians were forced to move from Azerbaijan to Armenia, and 170,000 Azeris from Armenia to Azerbaijan [15]. In light of the events which broke out in this region at the beginning of 1990, the flow of refugees between the two republics resumed with renewed force. Moreover, the forced migration from this region involved the Russian Federation, the Ukraine, Turkmenia and Kazakhstan since the refugees from Azerbaijan were now not only persons of Armenian nationality but also the Slavic-speaking population and primarily Russians. In just 10 days in January 1990 (from 14 through 24 January), over 16,000 Armenians were evacuated from Baku [16], while over 35,000 members of serviceman families, chiefly Russians, were pulled out of the border regions of the Nakhichevan ASSR, Baku and other regions of Azerbaijan [17]. According to the data of the USSR Goskomtrud [State Committee for Labor and Social Problems], the total number of persons leaving Azerbaijan in January 1990 was around 80,000 [18].

The preventing of such mass migrations, like the elimination of their consequences (both socioeconomic and moral), on the part of the government demand deeply planned and not only emergency measures as have been applied up to now. This is all the more important as the mass enforced resettlement of the citizens in the nation has occurred not only because of outright interethnic conflicts in the southern republic, but also the disasters of recent years including the accident at Chernobyl, the earthquake in Armenia. As a result of all these events, by the beginning of February 1990, over 500,000 people had already left inhabited areas [18]. In this context, we need both a social program worked out on the legislative level making it possible to efficiently provide material aid to the settlers and supply them with housing, jobs, places in children's preschool institutions and schools as well as the appropriate organizational structures to implement this.

Definite steps have already been taken in this direction. In addition to the republic refugee committees, an administration for migration and resettlement of the citizens organized within the system of the USSR Goskomtrud has already begun work in Moscow. The unique assistance staffs are registering the forced migrants, providing them with material aid, finding housing and are concerned for providing jobs. Each refugee is given 100 rubles in aid and up to 200 rubles for clothing and footwear from the reserve fund of the USSR Council of Ministers. However, as of now a refugee status has not been established on the legislative level and all these measures are nothing more than charity, although on a state level. The element of spontaneity still prevails in them, when at best certain problems of today are temporarily solved. In such a situation they do not consider

the various possible consequences both for the population of the departure and entry areas as well as for the migrants themselves and for this reason they can entail great costs. A clear example of such rash decisions is the action related to the locating of the Fergana Meskhetian Turks on the farms of the RSFSR Nonchernozem Zone. Accustomed to compact settlement and certain climatic conditions, many refugees for fully comprehensible reasons did not remain in the remote Russian villages and independently began to make their way into Azerbaijan closer to the Meskhetian Turk settlements which were established there in the 1950s. Naturally, such moves could not help but cause moral and material losses both for the settlers themselves and for the state (the setting up of each refugee in a new place cost approximately 20,000 rubles) [15].

It is also possible to speak about the covert forms in which the refugee problem is manifested. This is a phenomenon which has existed at least 10-15 years. It is a question of the growing departure of the nonindigenous population (predominantly Slavic-speaking) from a number of the Union republics. Judging from the materials of the postwar USSR population censuses, the given process began in the 1970s (1970-1979), when there was a large decline in the numbers of the Russian, Ukrainian and Belorussian population residing in Georgia and Azerbaijan. This, with other conditions being equal, contributed to the forming of a positive migration balance in the Russian Federation in the second half of the 1970s as the basic flow of migrants from this region was directed here. In the 1980s, the process also involved Armenia. Here the number, for example, of the Russian population according to the 1989 Census results was from 70 to 90 percent of the 1979 level. And from a covert form under the conditions of the acute interethnic conflicts, the process has developed into a mass flight of the Slavic nationalities. The process currently involves all the southern republics of the nation. One can expect analogous changes in the ethnic structures in the Baltic, Moldavia and in the Western oblasts of the Ukraine. And it is the Russians who are being most intensely driven out of these republics. In the near future, one can expect further changes in interrepublic migration and in particular, not merely a decline in the arrival of a foreign-speaking population in the Baltic but also a negative migration balance for the Baltic Republics in the exchange with other regions of the USSR and primarily with the RSFSR. As a whole, the current nationality aspect of the development of migration processes in a majority of the nation's republics reflects their desire for mononationality.

The research conducted by the Sociology Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences in the various regions of the nation⁴ has shown that along with the traditional factors in migration of a socioeconomic nature (such as the desire to improve one's material status), present here simultaneously is a large range of factors reflecting the particular features of modern interethnic relations in these republics and their nationality microclimate.

These are not only the difficulties of the adaptation of the nonindigenous population caused by an ignorance of the language and local habits, but also the recent adoption of a number of republic legislative enactments which create, in the opinion of a significant portion of the nonnationality population, unjustified privileges based on nationality and encroaching on human rights (for example, the enactments of an official language in Moldavia and the Baltic Republics; the enactments concerning election procedures for the soviets and the residence requirements for Estonia). At the same time, the respondents of all nationalities noted the great influence of nationality on realizing the opportunity to be admitted to a VUZ or promoted. According to the research data, the highest share of persons pointing to the presence of such a connection was in the Central Asian Republics with up to 50 percent. Characteristically, the Russian population in the national republics notes the given circumstance significantly more often than the indigenous population. According to the opinion of 1/3 of those questioned and in Kirghizia even 1/2, nationality determines their advancement on the job [19]. Most often it is the nonindigenous population which again is in a disadvantageous position in this regard. Such a conclusion is reinforced not only by the subjective views but also by the official statistical materials (see Table 3).

Table 3. National Composition of Population and Leaders of Enterprises and Organizations in Industry, Agriculture, Transport, Communications and Construction at Beginning of 1989, %

Union Republics	Nationality	Proportional Amount of Persons of Indigenous Nationality	
		In Population*	Among Leaders**
RSFSR	Russian	81.5	77.3
Ukraine	Ukrainians	72.7	79.0
Belorussia	Belorussians	77.9	77.7
Uzbekistan	Uzbeks	71.4	67.6
Kazakhstan	Kazakhs	39.7	39.5
Georgia	Georgians	70.1	89.3
Azerbaijan	Azeris	82.7	93.8
Lithuania	Lithuanians	79.6	91.5
Moldavia	Moldavians	64.5	49.8
Latvia	Latvians	52.0	63.1
Kirghizia	Kirghiz	52.4	55.1
Tajikistan	Tajiks	62.3	66.3
Armenia	Armenians	93.3	99.4
Turkmenia	Turkmen	72.0	71.8
Estonia	Estonians	61.5	82.2

* On 12 January 1989.

** On 1 January 1989.

Source: [20].

According to the data of the USSR Goskomstat and the materials of the 1989 All-Union Population Census, the proportional amount of indigenous nationalities among leaders of the enterprises and organizations in the main sectors of the national economy in a predominant majority of the Union republics (with the exception of the RSFSR, Uzbekistan and Moldavia) as a whole is not lower than the share of these nationalities in all the population. And in such republics as Georgia, Azerbaijan, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, the percent of the main nationality among the leading personnel at present is the highest. Simultaneously, there is significantly fewer nonindigenous Slavic population, including Russians, among the leading personnel than in the population.

All these circumstances, in essence, point to a change in the national microclimate in many republics and to a deterioration of relations between the indigenous and nonindigenous population under the conditions of the more complex sociopolitical and economic situation where, among the nonindigenous nationalities, there has arisen and is growing a feeling of psychological discomfort in virtually all the main spheres of activity. As a result, the departure of the nonindigenous population for outside these republics is intensifying and this, in essence, represents covert flight to a more favorable sociopsychological national environment.

Finally, the exacerbation of interethnic relations is related to the migration problem in those Union republics, where there is an ongoing demand to bring in additional labor resources for working at Union-level enterprises located here without considering the demographic factors. The abrupt changes in the established ethnic structures which have arisen as a result of this at present are creating the prerequisites for conflicts based upon nationality factors. These negative phenomena have been most acutely apparent in the Baltic Republics where, due to the low rate of natural reproduction and intensive interrepublican migration, the share of the indigenous population continues to decline.

Thus, all modern migration processes need a comprehensive assessment which takes into account the already existing and possible migration problems in the context of the various consequences of the territorial redistribution of the population. Thus, the possible loss over the next few years from the Baltic Republics of the nonindigenous population beyond any doubt will alter the ethnic structure in the region. It will scarcely reduce the quality of its labor potential, however it can lead to difficulties with labor resources, particularly in production areas and sectors which are nonprestigious for the local population.

In contrast to the Baltic Region, the loss of the Slavic-speaking population from the southern republics, particularly the Central Asian, on the contrary, can markedly worsen their labor potential. Additional capital investments will be needed to train new personnel. And this is under conditions of a comparatively high strain in the labor balance, that is, with a shortage of skilled personnel

in the cities and a surplus of unskilled manpower in the rural localities. According to the data of the USSR Goskomtrud, in Central Asia, under certain conditions 3 million persons could be employed in production, however in the first half of 1989, only 200,000 persons found jobs [9, p 45].

In placing the basic accent on the socioeconomic consequences of rash decisions in the area of migration policy, we have not touched upon that social tension in ethnic relations to which this can lead as well as those shifts in regional demographic development which are not immediately apparent and can entail a new nexus of different urgent problems. All of this requires a thorough study of the present migration situation, not only on the level of bringing it up but also in anticipation of possible trends in its development and the related consequences.

In concluding the analysis carried out above, let us reemphasize that over many decades the researchers like the administrative workers have usually only established various phenomena in migration (for example, the presence and acuteness of migration processes, the range of their distribution and so forth) but have not analyzed them with sufficient profundity and thoroughness. A reason was given at times for the causes of migration but the consequences of one or another migration process, if they were assessed, was more often done from the position of the past or the present but not the future. The latter is all the more important as the current migration situation in the USSR in being caused by a range of factors of a sociopolitical, economic, ethnic and demographic nature, has been largely shaped under the impact of the interregional and intersettlement processes which have occurred in recent years.

The modern trends in the migration processes in the various regions of the USSR and the related problem situations in the various spheres of activity are more often nothing more than the reverberation of rash (from the view of the possible consequences) different administrative decisions which, in turn, are caused by a lack of attention to migration as an essential factor and indicator for many aspects of the nation's development.

The problems related to the interethnic migration processes, including their consequences, could be at least partially resolved if profound and thorough research was conducted in this area and the persons taking decisions acquainted with their results. However, this would require not only a data base (both statistical and empirical) but also the appropriate organizational structures making it possible to pool the efforts of the currently scattered researchers on migration questions. The good understanding of migration questions in the 1920s was largely explained by the existence of the special State Scientific-Research Colonization Institute in Moscow. Similar subdivisions are also at work in a number of foreign countries. Among them are the Migration Institute in Finland (Turku) which is concerned with studying not only domestic problems but also the living

conditions of Finns residing in the United States, Australia and other countries. In our nation, where each year millions of people are involved in the migration processes, the establishing of a special center of such a sort would make it possible to focus the efforts of the researchers on studying the key problems which now concern not only internal Union but also international migration.

Footnotes

1. For the research method, see [3].
2. For the calculation method, see [4].
3. For the method and results of the problem classification of the USSR territories, see [8].
4. In the course of the research, around 12,000 persons were questioned from different nationalities in the employed population of a number of republics and oblasts of the nation including Georgia, Lithuania, Kirghizia, Kaluga Oblast of the RSFSR, Tajikistan, Turkmenia, Lvov Oblast of the Ukraine, Bashkiria and Tataria.

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Sociocultural Development and National Self-Awareness

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[Article by Yuriy Vartanovich Arutyunyan, doctor of historical sciences, professor and head of the Sociology Department of the Ethnography Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences]

[Text] The awakening of national self-awareness is a phenomenon of today and is seemingly familiar but at the same time paradoxical. On the one hand, there is the ubiquitous establishing of similar standards for the way of life and the acquiring of common human values of thinking and conduct. On the other hand, there is a clear desire of peoples for self-identification and in certain instances for separation. However, any contradiction is explained when we begin to examine more deeply the patterns of social and ethnocultural development of the peoples and in particular the desire for independence with a weakening or even the "withering away" of traditional ethnic traits. Such a desire is expressed not only in an orientation to an independent statehood and the broadening of political and economic right, but also in the ideology of the ethnocultural community.

In the past, when peoples differed substantially in terms of their sociocultural level, those of them who uncertainly lagged behind the "developed" peoples perceived the social hierarchy as a natural system of relations in not resisting it and not protesting against it. As the peoples were drawn together and the most profound

social differences were overcome between them, a tendency was formed for the leveling out of the sociocultural statuses and the instituting of strongly expressed elements of particularness and independence in interethnic relations. This actually is the essence of the apparent paradox: similarity leads to a demarcation or a colliding of national interests. Possibly over the long run, when an unconditional leveling out will occur in the social development of peoples and then the establishing of their real equality, when no one can any longer speculate on national feelings or ignore them, a new stage will occur in all-round interethnic integration.

Certainly in the distant future (its symptoms for now are only very timidly felt), a feeling of intranational community will scarcely be eliminated without a trace. A "common state self-awareness" in multinational countries has been established simultaneously with a rise in national self-identification and in this instance in Yugoslavia, where the censuses include the concept of belonging to the "Yugoslavs" in the series of ethnic features, the number of the latter has remained very meager, just 5-6 percent of the entire population [1]. In the Soviet Union, with the establishing of the "new historical community of the Soviet people" (instead of "one's own" nationality) the share of the former would scarcely be any greater.

In the article the idea of the self-identification of a nation is viewed in the context of the sociocultural structure of the population from the example of the most numerous people in the USSR, the Russians. The basis for the theoretical conclusions has been the material obtained in conducting an interregional sociological study on the "optimization of sociocultural conditions for the development and merging of nations" with the program and instrumentarium for this being published in [2].

According to the given program, in 1987, research was conducted in Moscow and using the voter rolls with a set interval, some 1,500 Russians were questioned [and] as control information—for comparison with the basic file—with materials being used from questioning Russians in the cities of Tallinn (280 persons) and Tashkent (300 persons).

Several words on the theoretical reading of the research concept. Although in the literature the concept of "self-awareness" has become firmly established, the author is inclined to use the term "self-identification." The problem is that a significant portion of any people, in firmly considering itself part of the given ethnic community, may not be aware of the real prerequisites of a subjective choice. For this reason, the term "self-awareness" is better employed for that portion of the population which actually is aware of its choice, that is, sees and feels the objective grounds for its own self-identification. In this instance, the concept of "self-awareness" acquires an additional meaning viewed now as a qualitative analysis of one's nationality. This explains the difference between those who consider themselves Russians but find it difficult to point to

common traits with their nation and those who not only feel but also recognize in themselves such traits. According to our materials, the difference between the two groups is rather great. Regardless of the obvious difference between "self-awareness" and "self-identification," in the given work we still will not differentiate strictly between them, since in the literature and in scientific parlance only the concept of "self-awareness" is employed. It can be said that the term "self-identification" is employed here for the first time.

In the empirical research the "self-awareness" of the Russians which, as we have already agreed, is used as a synonym for self-identification, was established, in particular, from replies to the questions "Are you linked by something with the people of your nationality? If 'yes,' then what precisely?" The results of the poll showed that for almost 85 percent of the Russians in Moscow, 88 percent in Tashkent and 97 percent in Tallinn, there was a characteristic feeling of kinship with the people of their nationality. In the "contrasting" different nationality environment, "homesickness" and a need for national solidarity were more fully apparent. A feeling of mutual "kinship" (judging from the research materials in Tallinn) is experienced here by the Russians more acutely than "at home."

Not all but a predominant majority (2/3) of those who feel such kinship not only state this but are also capable of pointing to definite traits of national community, that is, precisely what "links them with their people." Although the given question—in contrast to the previous research—was asked in an open form. In other words, it did not contain any hints.

The very structure of the awareness of one's community, to put it more accurately, the realized complex of kindred traits is approximately the same among the Russians in the various "ethnic" milieu, in Moscow, Tallinn and Tashkent, judging from the obtained data. Each time in the system of determined "kindred traits" there appeared an unconditional dominant of precisely ethnic features such as language, culture and customs (Table 1) and not common social qualities related, for example, to social interests. Of course, the interests of the social community cannot help but be present but they are not felt in an obvious manner. Aside from the basic range of "kindred elements" the respondents (in truth, very rarely) also mentioned particular features of conduct, "place of birth" (or "place of residence") and "external appearance." We established a fundamental similarity in the range of basic "kindred" features, although certain variations are encountered in their distribution by national regions. The most important are related to language as the main "ethnic determinant." For example, in Moscow, language as a kinship factor was mentioned by one out of every four persons questioned and this was in the same proportions as the other features of "culture" and "character." But in Tallinn and Tashkent "language" emerged in first place with around ½ of the "choices" for it (almost double the figure than in Moscow). The difference is explained by the fact that in

the different ethnic environment (Tallinn and Tashkent) the "linguistic differentiation of the ethnoses is more noticeably felt than in the relatively unilingual environment (Moscow) where the Russian language is an universal feature. Thus, the structure of the felt features of national community, if we assess national self-identification, is not of serious significance. Such an assessment to a significant degree is situational.

Table 1. Distribution of Answers to Question "What Links You to Your People?", %

Features of Kinship	Moscow	Tallinn	Tashkent
Language	24	39	44
Culture (way of life, customs, rites)	24	34	23
Character traits	25	20	9
Historical fate	9	8	17
Other	10	2	7

In the feeling of national self-identification—with all of its "universality"—one does not observe a statistically significant differentiation by demographic or social features. In truth, definite differences all the same are apparent between the socioprofessional groups. For example, in Moscow, from 40 to 50 percent of the respondents belonging to workers of varying skill not only noted "kinship," but also pointed to its features, while among specialists and leaders this share was 66-75 percent. How are such differences to be explained? By the higher level of identification with one's nation inherent to the specialists or simply by their educational level, by the ability to better formulate the answer and express their ideas more intelligently? It is rather the latter, since the workers, particularly the low-skilled, found it more difficult to answer the open questions. We judge the level of

development of a feeling of community with one's people from the aggregate of all replies, that is, considering those who "found it difficult to answer." As a result, the feeling of "kinship" was leveled out for all the socioprofessional groups.

The population census also serves as an unique evidence of the extremely broad self-identification of the Russians. It turns out that among the Russians (in contrast to other peoples), there are virtually no individuals who name the language not of their nationality as the mother tongue. Of course, here a role is played by the broad distribution of Russian in the USSR and, as a consequence, its universal knowledge by the Russians. However, a knowledge of a language is not the final criterion for considering it the mother tongue. Among the Armenians living in Yerevan, there were 20 percent who did not know Armenian very well but, nevertheless, considered it their mother tongue. Certainly here the criterion is not so much a knowledge or mastery of the language as is kinship with their own people.

A feeling of kinship has a qualitative "hierarchy" and differs in intensity in the population groups. In the research an attempt was made to scale the feeling of the national self-identification of the Russians. Three groups were established: the first made up of those who felt that nationality should be stated in documents (the passport was mentioned); the second group included respondents who felt this was not obligatory while in the third were those denying the necessity of any documents. A majority of the respondents in the capital cities (up to 60 percent) pointed to the documentary recording of nationality. From Table 2, we can see that a large portion of the Russians—37 percent in Tashkent and 38 percent in Tallinn—considered the recording of nationality in documents to be not merely a necessary matter but an "unconditionally" necessary one.

Intensity of National Self-Identification of Russians (Attitude Toward Registering Nationality in Documents)

1) Ответы на вопрос «Надо ли фиксировать национальность в документах?»	Moscow	Tallinn	Tashkent
2) Да, безусловно, надо	$\frac{1}{1}=59^*$	$\frac{38}{16}=54$	$\frac{37}{14}=51$
3) Пожалуй, можно			
4) Не обязательно	$\frac{31}{10}=41$	$\frac{21}{25}=46$	$\frac{56}{13}=49$
5) Не надо			

6) * Prozentным распределением между альтернативами автор не располагает.

Key:

1. Answers to Question "Should Nationality Be Registered in Documents?"
2. Yes, unconditionally so
3. Possibly
4. Not required
5. Not necessary
6. * The author did not have percentage distribution between alternatives.

Others while supporting such an opinion were not so rigid in insisting on it (correspondingly 14 and 16 percent). The remainder—in Moscow, Tallinn and Tashkent—either were indifferent to this (31-36 percent) or negative (10-13 percent). The group against registration of nationality was the smallest by a bit.

In the research on the Muscovites, it turned out that the older the respondents the more frequently they felt it necessary to record nationality in the documents: 54 percent of the population supported such an opinion under the age of 40, 57 percent in an age of 40-50, 60 percent at an age of 51-60 and 68 percent over 60. Among the youth, the higher the educational level the less categoric the indication of the need to record nationality. Muscovites with a primary and secondary education in their predominant majority (61-70 percent) felt it advisable to give nationality in documents; among persons with a specialized secondary education such an opinion was shared by 58 percent, and among those completing the VUZ 54 percent. In the socioprofessional groups, the same trend was apparent, in truth, with major stipulations. Among the workers, 60-85 percent would require documentary registration of nationality and among the intelligentsia, 55 percent. The "conservativism" of the workers and intelligentsia derives from various sources. The "conservativism" of the promoted socioprofessional groups is largely situational and is related not so much to culture as it is to an awareness of concrete situations in the distribution of active socioprofessional roles and this, to a certain degree, influences their national orientation.

It is perfectly obvious that in certain instances the "restrained" or even negative attitude toward the registering of one's nationality in documents does not exclude an awareness of kinship with one's people. A predominant majority of those who sought the recording of one's nationality and those who felt this superfluous felt kinship with their people, although, in truth, with a varying expressiveness of the feeling and, naturally, the corresponding proportions of "choices." Among those who insisted upon recording nationality virtually all (up to 90 percent) felt their kinship while among those who did not insist on such a registration "kinship" was expressed in $\frac{1}{4}$ of the population. The differences between the groups were caused not so much by the relationship of "choices" as by the varying culture of these groups and respectively by the attitude toward their nationality. Those who feel kinship but do not consider it necessary to register nationality to a greater degree than the others exclude the "canonization" and "consecration" of their national feelings.

The desire to formalize one's nationality to a certain degree is inversely dependent upon the sociocultural appearance of a person. The more rigidly national self-awareness is expressed and hence the desire for its documentary formalization, the more conservative the socionational interests in the broad sense of the word. Research materials in Moscow illustrate the given idea. Thus, the group of the population which in the political

sphere supports more or less stereotypic views and feels that "the strengthening of national defense might" is more important than "the development of democracy," particularly often insists upon the need to register nationality. The same thing happens when one investigates for what items it is preferable to spend finances. For example, among the Muscovites who are Russians and propose that the state funds must be spent first of all on defense, some 68 percent give importance to the registering of nationality, while for those for whom it is particularly important to finance education, the figure is 49 percent. The same and even more noticeable differences were apparent in ascertaining in what sphere of social life "changes should occur first." Those who felt that the main thing was to instill order and toughen discipline, in a predominant majority of cases (72 percent) felt it obligatory to register nationality, while among those who insisted on democracy and glasnost the figure was just 44 percent.

To the same degree differences are apparent between these orientations in nationality relations when the question arises of culture. As was already said, with a rise in education among the Moscow populus, there is a decline in the interest in registering nationality. Other data on cultural activeness, for example the reading of artistic literature or the intensity of attending theaters, confirm that the higher the culture of the population the less their formal attributes of nationality (registration in documents) are "canonized." For example, among those who do not know a foreign language, 66 favor the registration of nationality while among those knowing one, the figure is 48 percent.

The same thing is confirmed in turning to other spheres of life and, in particular, family-everyday. Suffice it to say that with a negative attitude toward nationally mixed marriages, $\frac{1}{4}$ of the Russians feel it necessary to register nationality in the documents. Among those who support traditional interpersonal relations and prefer being with relatives, 85 percent favors registration while those preferring comrades and friends, the figure is 49 percent. Among those who have a spouse of the same nationality, 62 favor the documentary recording of nationality, while 47 percent supports such an orientation in nationality-mixed families.

Our data also show differences between the relatively traditional and modern views which are related to progressive changes in the national orientations (accompanying the growth of culture). However, the paradox is that progressive changes can produce a negative effect which is explained by the self-isolation of persons caused by the designated competitive relations. Increased education is not sufficiently linked to a broadening of the international orientations of the population. In the production sphere, the more prominent groups more acutely feel competitive relations and are under the sway of national exclusiveness in spite seemingly of their socio-cultural roles.

For example, in Moscow, CPSU members more often favor the recording of nationality (63 percent) than do Komsomol members (53 percent); correspondingly, among the people of Tallinn they are 60 and 49 percent and among the people of Tashkent, 61 and 42 percent. The "influential" groups in production, regardless of their advantages in social status and education, in their maturity (65 percent) favored the recording of nationality in documents, while the "noninfluential or little influential" (although among them there is a predominance of little educated and vocationally untrained persons) comparatively fewer give importance to this factor (50-55 percent). In Moscow, the "influential" Russians favor the recording of nationality more frequently than do the "uninfluential" ones, while in Tashkent a difference in these views is virtually absent (49 and 45 percent). In Tallinn, the "influential" Russians markedly less (48 percent) than the "uninfluential" (58 percent) favor the recording of nationality. Clearly in Tallinn, where there is high competitiveness of the indigenous nation, the formalizing of one's nationality is less justified for the Russians. Certainly this does not mean that among the Russians here there has been a dulling of national interests and orientation. Rather, on the contrary, in an ethnically contrasting milieu one's own national values grow even more. For example, the better the Russians know Estonian in Tallinn the more they value their own nationality and the more they favor recording their nationality in documents (2/3 of those favor the recording of nationality among those knowing Estonian and 1/3 among those not knowing it). Since the actual registering of nationality does not provide any advantage, as a whole for the republic the Russians point more rarely to the need for this than in other places.

Do not these facts show that such corrections can sometimes bring the value of "influence" into the system of social relations? It is no accident that those groups of Russians in Tallinn who feel that it is difficult to find work such as theirs, and these are primarily "influential" groups, favor the recording of nationality in documents much more rarely than others, regardless of their advantages in education and culture. Among them 29 percent favors registering the nationality in documents, that is, 2-fold less than in the other "noncompetitive" groups (those who find it "easy to get a job").

The given data show that social position (status), depending upon the ethnic environment, introduces various corrections into the process of national self-identification. Thus, the danger of making a fetish out of nationality can be brought about, at first glance, by seemingly polar but in fact interrelated sources (factors): on the one hand, by the conservatism accompanying the "inferior" culture and by harsh traditions (which is characteristic for the little educated and little skilled strata of the population) and, on the other, and this is characteristic for rather well-educated persons, by a desire, even unconscious, to utilize in one way or another the "nationality factor" in the struggle for better social position. This means that the professionalization of the

population and sociocultural growth do not eliminate the danger of fetishizing nationality. Thus, the social effect of national self-identification against the background of modern sociocultural development in society is far from uniform. There are the most different trends which determine the situation in the nation and its development in the future.

The progressive changes in the development of peoples in and of themselves do not eliminate the acuteness of the nationality problem. However, the long run encourages optimism. It must be expected that in this rivalry of culture and social vestiges the future lies with a progressive culture for the peoples. The qualitative improvement in culture ultimately can remove the nationality limitations of people and this is capable of improving the system of social relations and removing the division into "ours" and "theirs." An improvement in national self-identification is a general problem which demands constant attention and special research.

If one isolates the four "ethnic" sources which feed national self-awareness—the "kindred" related to origin, the "psychological," "cultural" and, finally, the "social" (social position and social interests of the ethnos), then with the organic interaction of such sources, their certain autonomy is also apparent. The "kindred" source fed by an awareness of the common origin and historical fate of the people is a product of a sociobiological nature and this is felt particularly strongly in extreme situations which bring together people "of the same clan and tribe" in their own or particularly in a different ethnic environment. Equally situational is the "psychological source" of national self-awareness. Under the conditions of the devaluation of the spiritual ideas historically accumulated by the people—from religious to social—the vacuum is filled by hypertrophied national feelings, by the "consecration" of national values and a noticeable exacerbation of national self-awareness.

The "ethnocultural" and "ethnosocial" sources of national self-awareness are less situational. The "ethnocultural" stimulators of national self-awareness are dictated by real cultural interests, by the familiarization of the people with their national culture, including standards of conduct, language, sociomoral ideas, customs, rites and other attributes of the daily way of life which have national casts. These "cultural sources" of self-awareness are clearly reflected in art, literature, folklore, family and domestic standards which determine the national community and awareness of the people. Of course, the character of cultural nationality traits varies in the social groups having different notions of traditions and innovations, who have become differently acquainted with modern international culture and who represent the interests of different ethnic groups including the "bearers," "expressers" and "consumers." But such a mosaic nature of the ethnocultural sources of national self-awareness does not tell on its intensity and concrete manifestation.

Even more differentiated is the fourth, ethnosocial source including social interests gaining expression in national self-awareness. The bearers of these are primarily groups interested in active social roles or in acute need of ethnosocial contact and oriented primarily at such contacts. The "social" source of national self-awareness is derived from the nature of social relations. The social essence of such a source is the desire to "activate" one's own peoples and to activate one's own social roles. Its influence grows as the social backwardness of the peoples is overcome and as their sociocultural potential rises. Contrary to the stereotype adopted in our nation, the growing similarity of the social traits of nations in no way leads, as has been predicted, to their "merging." Rather, on the contrary, such "similarity" reinforces the autonomy, the mutual social independence of the peoples and the desire for free self-expression. It is no accident that the former "development" of nations did not produce the expected social effect [3].

It can be assumed that large nations which do not compete with different-nationality "impregnations" in their environment are less aware of the heightening of national feelings, they do not experience the hyperbolization of national self-awareness and have less need for this. Although with the broadening of interethnic contacts in "one's own" and particularly in a different nationality environment we cannot exclude even for these peoples a heightening of "national self-awareness" dictated by the necessity for the effective realization of their social interests.

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A Half-Century of Silence: The 1937 All-Union Population Census

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[Excerpt] [pp 56-59] The 1937 Census has preserved data on the national composition of the USSR. The 1926 All-Union Population Census recorded 194 nationalities because the task had been posed of the most complete study of the nation's ethnic composition. During the period of preparing the 1937 Census, the Census Bureau discussed this question and it was decided to record not the people but rather the nationality. A "Dictionary of Nationalities for Working Out the 1937 Population Census" (Moscow, 1936) was drawn up as well as a "Dictionary of Languages" (Moscow, 1936).

According to the Dictionary of Nationalities, there were 109 nationalities established but in line 110 "other" another 56 were given, that is, 155 nationalities were taken into account. According to the Instructions for Filling Out the Census Sheet in 1937, they were to: "fill in the nationality to which the person being questioned belongs" [9]. This principle of self-determination in the 1937 Census was expressed most completely and was precisely comparative with the previous Soviet Censuses. In addition, the census sheet contained the question No 4 about the mother tongue, and here also they recorded as the mother tongue that language which the person being questioned himself designated. For children who did not know how to talk, the language in which conversation was usually conducted in the family was entered as the mother tongue.

Below, we give two tables (6 and 7) on the nationality composition of the USSR population and these in the original had been filled in by hand. The first of these contains a complete list of the counted nationalities. The second includes 34 nationalities and for these the researchers made a comparison with the data of the 1926 Census.

Several sheets in the same file where Table 7 was "resting" contained handwritten calculations for the nationality composition in 1926. From the markings on these sheets it can be seen that in the table, in the column for "1926," the Komi included also the Zyryans and Permyaks, in the Tatars were added the Bukharans and Kryashens (given in the 1926 Census as separate peoples), the Dolgans were included in the Yakuts, the Fergana Turks and Kurama were included in the Uzbeks, and the Oyrots included, in addition to the Oyrots themselves, the Altays, the Black Tatars, the Teleuts and Talysh. Footnotes clarify that the number of Jews also included the Gorskiy, Georgian and Central Asian Jews, while among the Georgians were the Adzhars, Mengre's, Laks and Svans [10] (Tables 6 and 7).

Table 5. Number of White Collar Personnel and Junior Service Personnel in USSR on January 1937 [8]

Total number of white collar personnel	11,255,000 persons
In addition, junior service personnel	4,717,000
Distribution of white collar personnel by national economic sectors:	
a) Industry	1,871,000
b) Agriculture, sovkhozes, MTS [machine-tractor station], kolkhozes	1,560,000
c) Construction	488,000
d) Transportation and communications	755,000
e) Forestry	192,000
f) State and cooperative trade	1,509,000
g) State and public institutions, education, public health	3,950,000
h) Public dining, utilities and other institutions and enterprises	930,000
Distribution of white collar personnel by types of occupations:	
Engineers, architects (not counting engineer leaders of enterprises, shops and so forth)	249,601
Agronomists	79,666
Other higher technical personnel (designers, forestry officers, afforestation inspectors and so forth)	28,459
Land surveyors, reclamation workers, topographers	25,637
Agrotechnicians, veterinary technicians	70,482
Other middle-level technical personnel (technicians, work superintendents, chiefs of stations, captains and so forth)	782,048
Inferior technical personnel (foremen, road foremen and so forth)	213,994
Draftsmen	47,399
Academicians, professors, VUZ instructors, scientific workers	79,729
Teachers	969,428
Other cultural-educational personnel (journalists, librarians, club heads and so forth)	396,547
Physicians	105,262
Veterinarians	13,402
Dentists	13,303
Feldshers, midwives	119,459
Veterinary feldshers and other middle veterinary personnel	57,125
Other middle-level medical personnel	205,411
Bookkeepers	683,787
Accountants	933,502
Other accounting personnel (statisticians, calculators and others)	678,218
Economists	143,584
Other planning-inspection personnel (norm setter inspectors)	483,904
Office personnel (secretaries, typists and so forth)	562,497
Leaders of enterprises, institutions and their shops and departments	1,046,357
Kolkhoz chairmen	266,795
Heads of sovkhoz and kolkhoz farms	146,356
Heads of shops and warehouses	343,182
Other trade and economic personnel (salespersons, commodity experts and so forth)	1,282,718
Judges	7,618
Procurators, investigators	12,694
Other legal personnel	25,961
Art workers	158,992

Table 5. Number of White Collar Personnel and Junior Service Personnel in USSR on January 1937 [8] (Continued)

Communications workers (radio telegraph operators, telegraph operators and so forth)	150,893
Other white collar personnel	871,019
TOTAL:	11,255,031 persons

Table 6. Nationality Composition of USSR According to Materials of 1937 All-Union Population Census [11]

Nationalities	Number
Russians	93,933,065
Ukrainians	26,421,212
Belorussians	487,406
Polks	636,220
Czechs	11,733
Serbs	22
Bulgarians	90,919
Latvians	66,843
Latgals	123
Lithuanians	9,801
Germans	1,151,602
Swedes	20
Norwegians	2
English	2
Moldavians	223,850
Romanians	24
French	8
Italians	19
Spaniards	6
Greeks	268,889
Albanians	1,130
Tajiks	1,137,995
Persians	15,116
Berbers	—
Dzhemshids	2
Khazars	1
Beludzhi	5,447
Afghans	993
Ossetians	319,350
Ests	91,007
Saami	1,841
Mordvinians	1,248,867
Mari	401,092
Udmurts	568,268
Komi-Zyryans	262,560
Komi-Permyaks	121,948
Khanty	22,822
Mansy	6,143

Table 6. Nationality Composition of USSR According to Materials of 1937 All-Union Population Census [11]

Nationalities	Number
Madyars	78
Nenets	79,194
Sulkups	1,749
Chuvash	1,167,817
Bashkirs	757,935
Tatars	3,793,413
Turki	10,285
Turks	2,134,250
Karachayevo-Balkars	108,545
Kumyks	134,100
Nogai	33,085
Kazakhs	2,862,458
Kirghiz	846,503
Karakalpaks	179,282
Turkmen	747,723
Uzbeks	4,550,532
Uighur	109,220
Oyrots	46,508
Shorty	15,090
Khakassians	48,334
Tuva	1,183
Yakuts	293,307
Talysh	99,244
Tats	56,975
Kurds	48,399
Gypsies	2,211
Armenians	1,968,721
Georgians	2,008,839
Adzhars	88,230
Abkhazians	55,561
Abaza	13,802
Cherkess	78,733
Kabarda	150,690
Checheno-Ingush	436,076
Dargins	144,665
Laks	50,135
Avars	232,299
Lezgins	206,487

Table 6. Nationality Composition of USSR According to Materials of 1937 All-Union Population Census [11]

Nationalities	Number
Tabasarians	32,938
Udins	20
Jews	2,669,147
Crimean Jews	6,104
Gorskiy Jews	14,410
Georgian Jews	101
Central Asian Jews	25,437
Arabs	27,621
Aysors	3,214
Karelians	233,006
Finns	144,717
Izhors	8,622
Veps	29,842
Buryat-Mongols	218,597
Kalmyks	127,336
Evenki	32,936
Evens	2,837
Nanay	6
Ude	2
Chukchee	13,674
Koriaks	7,562
Itelmens	1
Oduly	261
Kets	1,080
Karaiks	3,464
Nikhva	1
Yuits	—
Unangans	1
Chinese	38,527
Dungan	14,011
Koreans	168,259
Japanese	1
Mishar	3,213
Others	2,555,527
Persons not precisely designated, not indicated	134
TOTAL:	161,753,176

Table 7. Nationalities of Union and Autonomous Republics of USSR According to Materials of 1926 and 1937 Population Censuses* [12]

Nationalities	1926	1937
Russians	77,791,124	93,933,065
Ukrainians	31,194,976	26,421,212

Belorussians	4,738,923	4,874,061
Uzbeks	3,955,238	4,550,532
Tatars	3,029,995	3,793,413
Kazakhs	3,968,289	2,862,458
Jews**	2,672,499	2,715,106
Azeris**	1,706,605	2,134,648
Georgians	1,821,184	2,097,069
Armenians	1,568,197	1,968,721
Mordvins	1,340,415	1,248,867
Chuvash	1,117,419	1,167,817
Tajiks	978,680	1,137,995
Germans**	1,238,549	1,151,601
Kirghiz	762,736	846,503
Nationalities of Dagestan**	660,459	770,624
Bashkirs	713,693	757,939
Turkmen	763,940	747,723
Udmurts	504,187	568,268
Checheno-Ingush	392,619	436,076
Mari	428,192	401,092
Komi	375,871	384,508
Ossetians	272,272	319,350
Yakuts	241,365	239,307
Karelians	248,120	233,006
Moldavians	278,905	223,848
Buryat-Mongols	238,060	218,597
Karakalpaks	146,317	179,282
Kabarda	139,925	150,690
Kalmyks**	129,321	127,423
Cherkess	63,270	78,733
Abkhazians	56,957	55,561
Khakassians	45,608	48,334
Oyrots	45,925	46,508
Other nationalities and persons not distributed by nationality	3,406,080	5,149,537
TOTAL:	147,037,915	162,039,470

* According to the 1937 Census materials, the population had been calculated for the numerically most representative nationalities within each oblast, kray and republic. For this reason, a portion of the population counted in this table of nationalities and shown in small numbers in other oblasts, kray and republics for the column "1937" was included in the group of persons not distributed by nationality [Ibid.].

** On the margins of the table, the number of certain nationalities for the 1937 Census was counted as follows: Jews 2,715,108, Azeris 2,134,250 (with the note: "by converting into Turks"), Germans 1,151,602, nationalities of Dagestan 770,624, and Kalmyks 127,336. (Authors' note.)

Self-Determination of Youth Under Conditions of Perestroyka: Attempt at Social Typology

905D0023F Moscow SOTSILOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 90 (signed to press 5 Jun 90) pp 94-96

[Article by Zh.M. Grishchenko and V.A. Polikarpov: "Self-Determination of the Youth Under Conditions of Perestroyka: Attempt at Social Typology"]

[Text] The existence of social forces which influence the perestroyka process is recognized by virtually everyone. Much more complex is the question of identifying these forces. Without claiming an exhaustive solution to the problem, we would submit our classification for the student youth. The conclusions have been drawn on the basis of data from a questionnaire conducted in one of the artistic VUZes of Minsk in 1987-1988.

The information obtained was processed using factor analysis. The factors were certain hypothetical conceptual positions including the attitude of a person to the sphere of social activity, the properties procedurally operating as the basis for classifying the respondents and integrating the individuals into real social groups (socio-cultural communities). These conceptual positions we called the models of self-realization.

By a sociocultural community in the given case we understand a large social group which presupposes a commonness of social ideals and values and being a sort of space for integrating the representatives of different classes, estates, strata, castes and so forth within a single social activity.

From the table of the intercorrelations of 25 features and 3 consecutive matrices of residual correlations we extracted 4 centroid factors. We will describe them in accord with the "self-realization scale" obtained in the course of interpreting the data.

The left-hand side of the scale is occupied by a group which brings together a "nihilistic model of self-realization." The information content of the factor is 15.8 percent. What characterizes this group? In the structure of the factor "nihilistic model of self-realization" significant loads were produced by nine features: indifference to future work (0.479)¹ and closely related to it even in the intercorrelation table is the feature of disappointment at the VUZ (0.412); a negative set for acquiring professional mastery (-0.424), a negative set about authority in a student group (-0.383); an energetically expressed set of establishing the necessary ties (emotional response to the open question with a hint of disdain or neglect) (-0.463). In addition, for the given model there was a characteristic negative set for organizing everyday life (-0.470). The greatest load was given to the feature expressing the set of fighting against the bureaucracy (0.508).

The "nihilists" hold an active social position. They demand complete, uncontrolled freedom of choice (0.419) understood by them as the freedom of creativity,

they support a majority of the "informal" groups (0.399), and "informality" operates as an abstract value. In disregarding involvement in social ties (in their eyes, this is a system of cover-up and rigid regulation), the "nihilists" consciously accept a loss of social protection. This model of self-realization can conditionally be described as a maximum of freedom and a minimum of social protection.

The right-hand side of the scale is occupied by the "careerist model of self-realization." The youth group accepting this model has been termed by us the "bureaucracy reserve." There is semantic certainty for the factor (its information content is 5.7 percent) "achieving success in society." Its structure included seven features among which are the set to work in the specialty (0.439), indifference to the selected VUZ and profession (0.364). Of indisputed value is establishing a position of a social organizer (0.490) and this is viewed as the optimum way to attain success. The greatest factor load was for the feature "establishing the necessary ties" (0.599). The representatives of this youth group relate negatively to the idea of uncontrolled choice (-0.367), they are aggressive in terms of the informal associations (0.380) and consider their own position as a "cog" in the system to be the guarantee of stability (0.418). In opposition to the "nihilistic," this position is characterized by a formula "minimum of freedom, maximum of social protection."

The next self-regulation model is positioned on our hypothetical scale somewhere between the first two and is called the "consumer model of self-realization" (information content of factor 5.0 percent). The given group of young people could be considered in the category of "Philistines," if a negative significance were not interjected in the term. In the structure of the factor are five features, including the desire to establish a family (0.424), to spend free time well (0.405), satisfaction with the VUZ (0.323) (the only group out of the four which was satisfied with the VUZ: with the level of the lectures given, the quality of the programs and so forth) and a desire to succeed in studies (0.334). The greatest factor load was given to the feature "to create comfortable housing conditions" (0.480). In our view, this group is always socially passive, although it does play a certain role in ensuring the normal functioning of society. It gravitates toward the next group which is united by a model also positioned between the two extremes and termed the "prospective model of self-realization." (The factor included nine features, its information content is 22.3 percent.)

Here the greatest factor load was given to the feature expressing the set of creating a strong, happy family (0.760). For the given group generally, the family is an indisputable value. Even in the intercorrelation table, this feature discloses the highest correlations with virtually all of the features included in the structure of the given factor. From all appearances, the value of a "happy family" determines the choice of all remaining sets and values. The representatives of this group are oriented at assimilating the principles of professional skill (0.736).

they show dissatisfaction with the VUZ (0.640), and give great importance to self-improvement in the sphere of professional skill (0.603). Very important for them is the organization of everyday life, the creation of comfortable housing conditions in the future (0.674), and the ability to dress attractively and fashionably (0.699). The group relates positively to involvement in social work (0.584), it places hopes on the development of student self-government (0.596), and considers essential the establishing of their authority in the student group as a good comrade (0.680). As a whole, this factor can be formulated as "being useful to others."

The analysis shows that the world view of the given group is based on denying the views of the first two groups, the "nihilists" and the "bureaucracy reserve."² In the open part of the questions concerning the problems of perestroika, the given groups are condemned as forces of inhibition. In both rejected groups one can assume the existence of a critical attitude toward the idea of socialism. The ideological position of the fourth group described as "prospective" by the model is formed not in the process of the scholastic assimilation of dogmas divorced from actual reality but rather from direct daily opposition to real opponents. In one way or another, its representatives consider the basic tasks of perestroika to be now "improving society within the framework of socialism and the ideological defense of socialism." Unfortunately, the employed instrumentarium does not make it possible to bring out this position in detail and to disclose the depth of its awareness. Nevertheless, the youth group designated by us as "active socialists" and, as far as we know, which has still not fallen into the viewpoint of scientists is very interesting. In our research its self-realization model was represented by a general factor. There is no doubt as to the reality of its existence but at the same time in the sphere of mass information its philosophy is in no way represented as the community does not have its own "ideologists." In part, this is explained by the fact that the group brought together by the given model arose comparatively recently, in the period of perestroika, and is in the stage of organization.

In conclusion, we would point out that the correlations of sex, age and social affiliation as represented in the traditional classification were not significant.

Footnotes

1. The amount of the factor load is given in the parentheses.

2. A comparison is possible due to the combined nature of the variations of answers in the questionnaire. Many of them, in addition to the ordinary choice, could be supplemented with their own judgments, using specially provided lines.

The Moscow Purchaser

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press 5 Jun 90) pp 97-101

[Article by Tatyana Pavlovna Rukavishnikova, senior science associate at the Center of Applied Work Integral, Arkadiy Mikhaylovich Sapozhnikov, candidate of economic sciences and department head at the All-Union Scientific Institute for Economics, Trade and Control Systems and Larisa Mikhaylovna Khazova, candidate of economic sciences and leading science associate at the designated institute. This is the first time they appear in our journal]

[Text] The lack of a saturated commodity market and the unsatisfactory organization of trade have led to the futile wandering of customers through stores in the hope of purchasing something. Free time and sometimes even working time is spent irrationally. It is essential to reduce the time and energy expenditures of people on getting to the stores in the search for the required commodity, to limit the maximum time required to reach the stores, create equal conditions for trade services for the public regardless of the level of commodity trade in the stores. This is particularly important for the capital with its multimillion population and a large number of visitors. The irrational specialization of the city trade network with over 5,500 state stores should contribute to this.

In order to ascertain the consumer orientations and character of behavior by purchasers in Moscow, the co-workers at the VNIIET [All-Union Scientific Research Institute for Economics, Trade and Control Systems] of the USSR Ministry of Trade conducted a sociological study (scientific leader, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences V.A. Rukavishnikov). The object of the research was purchasers of nonfood commodities.

For investigating the behavior of the customers it was essential to know what the people were purchasing, where, when and how often, as well as in what manner they behave in the situation of choice. All these questions were included in the questionnaire "Facing the Consumer" published in the newspaper VECHERNAYA MOSKVA on 24 April 1989. A total of 7,000 questionnaires were received back.¹ In addition to this, by a mail poll a survey was run in the aim of disclosing the real time expenditures on traveling to the hardware stores of different specialization and the socially preferable standards of time expenditures for these purposes. In the course of the mail poll of the 350 questionnaires sent out, 197 were returned.

The composition of the persons replying to the questionnaire "facing the consumer" by sex differed somewhat from proportions characteristic for the adult population of Moscow as the proportional amount of males was 24.6 percent in comparison with 43 percent among the population of working age, while for women it was 75.4 percent in comparison with 57 percent. The shift is

explained by the fact that women are the chief "suppliers" of their families with 75 percent of the women responding to the questionnaire and only a third of the men constantly purchasing industrial goods for the entire family. As for the socioprofessional composition of the respondents, among the questioned males there was a predominance of workers (20.6 percent), ITR [engineer-technical worker] and white collar personnel with a higher or specialized secondary education (47.3 percent), pensioners (16.2 percent); among the women workers comprise 6.2 percent, white collar personnel without a higher education were 15.5 percent, ITR and white collar personnel with a higher education were 55.1 percent, pensioners were 12.0 percent and so forth.

Over one-half of the respondents (53.5 percent) had adolescent children, including 57.9 percent with one child, 36.2 percent with two children, 4.2 percent with three, and 1.7 percent with four and more. The respondents included inhabitants of all the capital's rayons.

It was possible to establish a hierarchy of factors influencing the choice of the store for making the purchase: I—location of store (proximity to home for 62.9 percent of those replying, 34.4 percent for proximity to the job, 27.7 percent along the way home from work, and 17.8 percent in convenient places); II—better supply in comparison with other stores for 34 percent; III—shorter line than in other stores for 18.8 percent; IV—good services for 3.2 percent.

A most important indicator was the regularity (frequency) of visiting the stores. For this indicator, the purchasers relating to the various sex and age groups and to groups with a varying income level did not differ qualitatively among themselves: a majority visited the stores selling nonfood goods rather frequently and regularly. Thus, around 45 percent of the men and over 50 percent of the women went to these stores at least once a week; over 20 percent of the men and 17 percent of the women went at least once every 2 weeks; 13 percent of the men and 11 percent of the women went at least once a month.

At the same time, the age differences do influence the regularity of visiting the nonfood stores: since elderly people (after 55 years) visit the stores significantly more rarely than the youth, among them are fewer of those who visit the stores daily or at least once a week. The decline in purchasing activity for pensioners is also due to a sharp drop in the income level which determines purchasing power as well as with a change in the structure of consumer and vital orientations and their role in the distribution of labor within the family.

With an increase in the per capita income level, the share of expenditures increases for purchasing nonfood items: from 23 percent in the total family expenditure structure for those with a per capita income of less than 70 rubles a month, up to 31 percent for those with a per capita income over 200 rubles. This shows that for purchasing nonfood items families with a high income allocate

almost 4-fold more money from their funds than do families with an income below the official subsistence minimum (75 rubles a month).

The inequality in purchasing ability to one degree or another also influences real conduct as low sufficiency limits purchasing activity. However, under present-day conditions purchasing activity is strongly influenced not only by the shortage but also by fashion and by a shortening of the obsolescent period of the goods. Many items which traditionally are considered as luxury articles (motor vehicle, video equipment) are presently moving into the area of articles of daily demand and even vital necessity. For this reason, the linkage of income level and consumer orientation for real behavior is not linear and uniform.

The results of processing the questionnaires make it possible to draw conclusions on the traditional assigning of roles and functions in the family over the question of purchases. The character of the purchase (the cost of the thing, its purpose for the entire family or individual use, service life and so forth) and the type of acquired commodity to a certain degree are related to the organization of life within the family. In taking decisions to purchase such goods as clothing, footwear, children's utensils, haberdashery and cosmetic articles, the decisive voice belongs to the women, while on the questions of purchasing radio, photographic and musical equipment, furniture and motor vehicles, the women are inclined to heed the opinion of the men.

Young people, while they are living with their parents and until they have their own family, are not the "main suppliers." Nevertheless, they, particularly young women, very frequently visit the nonfood stores and this shows particular features in the consumer behavior of the given group of purchasers. Thus, the regularity of visiting the stores is related both to the assigning of roles and functions within the family between men and women, between the elderly and younger members of the family as well as to the income and age of the respondents.

We studied the reasons and motives in choosing the stores. If the factors which determine the choice of the store are ranked depending upon the number of "votes given to them," then the picture will be as follows: convenient location (57.2 percent); experience in purchasing analogous items (40.6 percent); advice of friends, acquaintances (14.3 percent); information obtained from references, by telephone and so forth (11.5 percent); advertisements by radio, TV and the newspaper (4.4 percent); advertisements in the store windows and on the street (0.7 percent); other factors and motives (4.4 percent). Since each respondent could give several variations, the total exceeds 100 percent.

The convenient location of the store is the determining factor; the role of advertising is very meager. The trade workers have virtually no choice on choosing the place for purchasing the good and are not viewed by the

Muscovites as competent advisors. The store's reputation is determined primarily by the assortment of its goods and only then by the quality of trade.

The structure of preferences for the location of stores shows that there are no differences between the opinions of the various purchaser categories. The disclosed structure of preferences is subordinate to the established and above-described hierarchy of factors as the purchasers would like to acquire the goods in specialized stores and department stores of the microrayons and rayons where they live.

An important characteristic in the real behavior of the purchasers is the time when they purchase the goods including on working days and days off, "along the way" on the "home—work" route or special trips to the stores. For cosmetics and office supplies, approximately one-half of the purchasers of both sexes stop off on workdays in traveling to and from the job. Household articles are purchased along the way by 43.2 percent of the women and 33.9 percent of the men and books, respectively, by 46.5 percent and 42.7 percent. Textiles, clothing, footwear, knitwear, headgear, electronic articles, radio and photographic goods, watches, jewelry articles, sports and musical articles and children's goods are acquired along the way in up to 30 percent of the respondents of both sexes. Basically, the necessary items are "acquired" through acquaintances or in the process of long journeys through the stores.

A significant portion of the respondents pointed out that under the conditions of the existing shortage it is very difficult to correctly assess time expenditures for an on-the-way visit to a store or the special search for an essential item during nonworking hours, since often one must visit several stores located in different parts of the city. On the way home from work or going to work, both men and women spend an average of 30 minutes going into stores; during off hours the men and women spend an average of around 40 minutes on the way from the store.

On the way to the stores selling clothing, women spend an average of 10 minutes more than do men. Men, in turn, spend 10 minutes more time on the way to stores selling radio supplies. In our opinion, these differences are rather related to the consumer interest and the behavior stereotypes of men and women than they are to the particular features of the location of the designated type of stores over the city's territory.

The opinions of the men and women on the acceptable duration for them of traveling to buy nonfood goods along the way or in a special visit to a store virtually do not differ for all groups and is 15-30 minutes. The positions of the various sex-age and socioprofessional groups are very close on the given question. The location of the trade enterprises over the territory of the city will be optimum for all consumer categories if each person can purchase the basic nonfood items within a 15-30-minute range or a radius of 5-7 km from home.

The results of the conducted poll provide an opportunity to assess the distribution of types of consumer behavior under the deficit conditions as proposed by Ye.A. Dukarevich: frequent but unsuccessful visits to stores; the purchasing of items outside the official distribution channels; the purchasing of goods which do not fully satisfy the consumers (a forced purchase) [2]. Clearly, the first type of consumer behavior is widespread in Moscow. The second type of consumer behavior is also widespread among the inhabitants of the capital as approximately one out of five respondents purchases goods from middlemen speculators. Here there are no substantial differences between the Muscovites having a low per capita income and Muscovites with high incomes. Thus, per capita income cannot at present be viewed as a factor which rigidly and uniformly determines the character of consumer behavior and classification in a certain type of purchaser. In the third type are approximately 6 percent of the male purchasers and 8 percent of the women.

In our opinion, the classification proposed by Ye.A. Dukarevich must be supplemented with one other fourth type: the purchasing of an increased-demand good suddenly appearing for sale (an unplanned purchase). Under the conditions of the chronic and total scarcity, this type of consumer behavior has become mass.

It is generally known that the family income level stimulates or limits the readiness of money-time expenditures for purchasing manufactured goods but the press of the shortage here makes a correction as the share of people ready to purchase a scarce item, even if the money must be borrowed for this, in all the groups is approximately the same (14-16 percent). Some 22-27 percent of the respondents were not inclined to abandon their planned purchases for the sake of a scarce item. But a majority of those questioned, regardless of income level, if money were available would endeavor to purchase an unplanned scarce item (see the Table).

Consumer Behavior of Purchasers With Varying Income Level in the Case of Selling a Scarce Item, %

Income Per Family Member (rubles per month)	Behavior in the Event of Selling a Scarce Item		
	If There Was Money, I Would Buy Without Hesitating	I Would Buy Even If I Must Borrow Money	If Such a Purchase Was Not Planned, I Would Not Buy
To 70	53.9	13.6	26.8
71-100	60.1	16.3	23.6
101-150	58.7	16.3	25.0
151-200	63.8	14.2	22.0
Over 200	63.0	13.7	23.3

At present, many people take the decision to purchase one or another commodity in being guided by the everyday rule: "Buy if the opportunity presents itself as tomorrow there may not be such an opportunity."

The described types characterize the real structure of consumer behavior of the Muscovites under the conditions of a shortage. However, this is a theoretical construct. There do not exist any real groups of purchasers who adhere to just one type of consumer behavior.

In order to obtain a fuller understanding of real consumer behavior of the Muscovites, it is essential to know the structure of the purchasers by the degree of their purposefulness. All the visitors to the stores can hypothetically be divided into four groups: "purposeful purchasers" who come with the intention of buying a specific item; "potential purchasers" who visit stores only when there is the money for purchases; "the curious" who go into stores when there is free time and "others" who go into stores for different reasons.²

We would classify 47 percent of the women and 26 percent of the men as "curious" purchasers, 21 percent and 17 percent as "potential," 28 percent and 52 percent as "purposeful" and 4 and 5 percent as "other." In each group there are persons of varying age and having different professions, per capita income level and so forth. Only one out of ten purchasers who goes to a store for a specific item consistently realizes his intentions. Thus, a larger portion of the store visitors must be put in the fourth type of consumer behavior regardless of for what purpose they came to the store. Such is the actual situation.

With a rise in income, there is a drop in the share of "potential purchasers" among persons who have the given income level and, on the contrary, there is an increase in the number of persons classified as "purposeful purchasers." With age there is a drop in the share of the "curious" and a rise in the number of "purposeful" purchasers.

The Muscovites do not have any illusions on a quick improvement in the state of affairs in trade: "As long as the necessary items are not in sufficient quantity it is impossible to improve trade services," (engineer, 30 years of age).

Among the 30 largest cities in the USSR, in terms of the proportional indicators for the selling area per 1,000 inhabitants, Moscow holds first place but if one considers that up to 40 percent of the goods are taken away by visitors, the city is in 17th place. The normalizing of the commodity market will reduce the number of such "tourists," but this will require an expansion of the currently empty selling area.

Footnotes

1. One out of every two questionnaires was computer processed. The current article presents the results of analysis of the data from polling 3,254 Muscovites. For the results of the research see [1].

2. A similar grouping was described by T.P. Karmazina [3].

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The Commodity Shortage and Its Criminogenic Consequences

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[Article by Vyacheslav Vitalyevich Sidorov, candidate of legal sciences and deputy department chief of the Scientific Center for Administration and Sociology Under the Academy of the USSR MVD and Gennadiy Grigoryevich Smirnov, graduate student at this institution of learning. This is the first time they appear in our journal]

[Text] In recent years, particularly during the period preceding the start of perestroika, the state endeavored to overcome many national economic problems by imposing various prohibitions, including criminal law ones. Because of this, the law enforcement bodies, and particularly the police, were made responsible not only for the real state of law and order but also, in essence, for the individual failures in the economy.

Naturally, any negative processes in the socioeconomic sphere in one way or another are reflected in the nature and scope of crime. However, the existing stereotype of the notion of strengthening criminal repression as some panacea against all misfortunes has prevented us from seeing the actual mechanism of all its possible manifestations. In the course of criminological research on the influence of the commodity scarcity on crime, a public opinion poll was conducted and the results of this have shown that this stereotype is rather resistant in the mass consciousness.¹

Definite circumstances of a sociopsychological property and primarily those related to the level of the awareness of the law, seriously prevent greater effectiveness in combating certain crimes. The poll was aimed at disclosing and analyzing these including the effect on the trend of criminal encroachments committed against the background of the commodity shortage and, in particular, to disclose the moral position of the public concerning the criminal law measures providing punishment for these actions.

The respondents viewed the basic reasons for the formation of the commodity shortage and its current exacerbation in the shortcomings of planning consumer goods output (49.6 percent), a cutback in imported deliveries (38.8 percent), uneven distribution in the individual regions of the nation (37.6 percent), nonfulfillment of the plans by industrial and agricultural enterprises (22.8 percent), by a marked rise in the monetary income of the population (12.4 percent) and by the low quality of the produced products (13.6 percent).²

As a whole, public opinion differs little from the viewpoint of economists concerning the sources for the development of the commodity shortage. According to the judgment of specialists, this is based upon a violating of the commodity-monetary equilibrium, that is, the predominance of the amount of money over the amount of goods, the lag in the production of consumer goods behind the purchasing power of the population and the poor quality of these goods. Here we should quote the thought of Academician L.I. Abalkin: The chronic scarcity of the economy has its roots in the familiar thesis that in our country, in contrast to capitalism, demand should outstrip supply [1].

The commodity shortage has forced the citizens to search for alternative channels to the state sector and the consumer cooperatives for purchasing essential goods and to turn to persons who do not shun illegal activities. This is confirmed by the answers from respondents to the question of from what categories of individuals they purchase the scarce item. In addition to trade workers (48.8 percent), these are persons who trade covertly near the stores (36.4 percent), citizens traveling abroad (16.4 percent), workers from the consumer service sphere (4.8 percent) as well as cooperative members, persons engaged in individual labor activities and the owners of farmstead plots (12.8 percent). To a significant portion the population has information about persons who following a speculative "price list" periodically "supply" clients with necessary goods as well as about trade "points" where, having overpaid, the desired can be "secured." In a word, the criminal "field" of the commodity shortage is rather wide.

Here around a third (29.6 percent) of those questioned are convinced that those from whom they purchased the goods have specially bought them up for reselling for the purpose of gain, while 24.4 percent merely suspect them of speculation, 25.6 percent did not give any thought to this and an equal number is convinced that what was sold to them by acquaintances had been purchased by them exclusively for personal need.

Many are forced to go "cap in hand" to the speculator because of the absence for sale of not only high-quality, fashionable goods but also often vital necessities. Thus, in 49.4 percent of such cases recorded in the studied cases about speculation, the persons were endeavoring to realize a normal demand for daily necessities, while 7.3 percent wanted to avoid difficulties related to purchasing increased demand articles (standing in line and

so forth), while for 15.3 percent the reason for turning to the speculators was the desire not to appear "worse than others." Some 28 percent of the cases related to a completely different category: they could be explained by a desire to satisfy a notorious longing for alcoholic beverages.

Characteristically, for 72.7 percent of the persons giving evidence, the "campaign" against the speculators means a deterioration of the material situation but they do not see any other way out, while 4 percent assumes that such a method for purchasing goods is cheaper than traveling to a different city for them. And some 15.3 percent has a monetary income making it possible to obtain painlessly everything required at a speculative price.

Also indicative is the circumstance that a purchase from a speculator is not a one-time action. The chronic shortage causes rather frequent contact between "purchaser and speculator." For example, such contacts were made sporadically by 72.1 percent of the witnesses in criminal cases involving speculation, 5.3 percent did so systematically (we would point out that these are persons who "do not complain" of their material situation) while only 14.6 percent had turned for the first time to the speculators for aid.

As is apparent from the results of the poll, there is a varying attitude of the respondents toward the various infractions of the law. This depends largely upon the established standards of our view of the world. For instance, a predominant majority (94.8 percent) would not permit the purchasing of goods from a person who stole these from other citizens, while 62 percent of those questioned considered this inadmissible from the moral viewpoint in the instance when the good was stolen at work, while 50.4 percent of the persons recognize that it might be possible for them to make a "black market" deal. Only 0.8 percent was against such amoral forms of buying and selling.

Also contradictory is the view of speculator activities by purchasers brought in to the criminal justice system as witnesses. Thus, a good half of them (49.9 percent) did not doubt that the speculators cause great harm to society, while others (36.9 percent), on the contrary, proceed from the view that they bring it definite benefit (6.6 percent of the witnesses voiced their indifference, and for the remaining 6.6 percent the required evidence was lacking in the materials of the criminal cases). Clearly, public opinion to some degree reflects the currently existing situation when, under the conditions of the commodity hunger, the "black market" somewhat reduces the acuteness of the shortage at least for the materially well-off strata.

Thus, relying on the given data, we can state a certain deformation in the perception of the law by the public and this has been formed under the heavy pressure of the commodity shortage. In this situation, the speculators are "necessary" persons while speculation is an inseparable element of our life.

One of the decisive prerequisites for the effective functioning of a legal standard is the coinciding of its demands with public opinion. But precisely such a coinciding at present is lacking over a number of aspects of the investigated problem as is shown by the polling of the citizens and an analysis of materials from the criminal cases. Moreover, as a whole, this cannot be since with the all-encompassing shortage of essential commodities for many consumers there is no other alternative but to purchase them under the counter. (Probably with the true development of cooperative and individual labor activity, the public will have a source for acquiring goods which is accessible to all and excludes speculative trade.)

Here let us point out that the selectivity of repression itself, that is, the failure to provide the inevitability of punishment, serves as an important supplementary factor contributing to the spread of illegal actions related to the total commodity shortage and in addition giving rise to serious consequences of a sociopsychological character.

The results of the research provide grounds to speak about the most typical forms of the distortion of individual awareness of the law and which negatively influence the state and dynamics of the investigated crimes.

First of all, in the given context we should note the reasons for the passive conduct of people who learn of specific instances of abuses in the commodity deficit. Over one-half of those questioned (63.2 percent) replied that they did not believe in their eradication, 30.8 percent did not want to act as witnesses in investigating criminal actions, 30 percent were afraid of losing an illegal opportunity to purchase scarce items and 16.4 percent accepted overpayment as a natural gratuity for "labor."

The mistakes in organizing legal propaganda and legal education have also influenced the indifference of the citizens. The materials of the poll make it possible to conclude that the co-workers from the law enforcement bodies rarely speak before the public and for this reason only an insignificant share (12.4 percent) of the information reaching the public concerning the measures adopted against guilty parties derives directly from them. Is it not for this reason that the public gains the sensation of the ineffectiveness and futility of combating the abuses stemming from the commodity shortage and a passivity is observed in helping the police in halting them, and this impedes the work.

Certainly, the existing public opinion psychologically is felt on the law enforcement bodies and, at times, cannot help but end up as a definite weakening in the resistance to criminal encroachments. This exacerbates the situation and here in the eyes of the public the social danger of the designated infractions is reduced and in the notion of some these infractions become almost a standard of conduct.

At the same time, the dissatisfaction with the consumer goods market has forced a reactivation of the above-mentioned stereotype which has been created in the mass consciousness over the years, namely that all problems are to be solved by harsh punitive means. It is no accident that 41.6 percent of those replying to the questions of the questionnaire proposed applying such a measure of punishment as imprisonment to persons engaged in selfish dealings related to the commodity shortage; at the same time, 22 percent favored the collecting from these persons of monetary fines and other property penalties. Incidentally, it must be pointed out that the passage of the recent *Ukase* of the Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet "On Strengthening Liability for Abuses in Crime and Speculation" of 27 February 1990 and which, in our view, is devoid of constructiveness, was carried out under definite pressure from public opinion.

In the process of studying materials of criminal cases involving the violating of trade rules, numerous facts were recorded (25 percent) of provocative conduct by purchasers, when they themselves requested that the good be sold from the storeroom, from the depot, warehouse or that it be concealed for them upon receipt, consequently acting as the initiators of criminal transactions. In 45 percent of the cases, these were trade or public dining workers and in 24 percent, third parties (6 percent of those questioned gave other answers).

In summing up what has been said about the sociopsychological factors influencing the spread of crimes which are of interest to us, let us emphasize that public opinion which should shape self-awareness, self-assessment and the responsibility of individuals, unfortunately, still has little effect on ensuring proper order in the trade network, where at times the group views of the staff prevail over the official proscriptions in regulating conduct. For now, there is a rather high threshold of tolerance for infractions by the trade workers for speculation and as a result of this the response to them has been dulled. These infractions of the law do not always evoke a sharply negative condemnation (in contrast to other crimes, for example, against the individual) and hence there is lacking an atmosphere of active aid to the law enforcement bodies in unmasking criminals.

An analysis of the state of public opinion disclosed not only unfavorable trends in the awareness of the law but also their linkage with negative processes which have been occurring in society for a number of years. The commodity shortage is a very complex phenomenon and its role in the system of objective determinants of crime is substantial. But usually the questions of improving work in preventing crimes explained by the existence of the commodity shortage are posed in such a manner that crucial significance is given to the economic, managerial and organizational-administrative measures. But we cannot help but see that the subjective factor (the low level of individual consciousness, faulty morals and so

forth) holds far from last place in determining such crimes. Hence, the growing role of ideological and educational measures.

At the same time, the poor legal knowledge of the citizens, the growing legal nihilism mirror the major shortcomings and oversights of the law enforcement bodies, the public organizations and the mass information media in ideological educational activities.

The observed decline in the social and legal activeness of the workers has been brought about, among other circumstances, by the persistent commodity shortage over an extended period of time and this has caused dissatisfaction among the people and an orientation at dishonest and illegal methods of realizing their needs.

Thus, there is a certain contradiction present. On the one hand, the commodity shortage is an objective, no longer tolerable reality the elimination of which will take certainly more than a year. On the other, the constant effect of this reality on public consciousness has led, as we have already said, to certain undesirable shifts in it. The citizens often not only justify immoral methods for securing necessary goods but also look benignly on those who help them become the owners of a cherished scarce item. How can this contradiction be overcome? Should we accuse persons who seek out any means for slaking their commodity hunger?

Clearly, the negative social reverberations of the phenomenon, as this has become one of the leading factors determining the state of social awareness, will not soon die out, in making themselves felt in the future, when the situation gradually begins to improve. It, in essence, has obscured everything else: both the increasing problem of crime, the housing question and the difficulties of public health. But since a definite inertia is inherent to social psychology, the people themselves, even after the saturating of the consumer market with goods, for a long time to come will reproduce and recreate in their imagination a reminiscence of the shortage, in following this in their behavior. This is why, it seems to us, even now it would be worth undertaking the appropriate steps to reduce its negative consequences, including in the legal sphere. Here, first of all, we must raise the question of mitigating criminal responsibility, replacing such types of punishment as imprisonment, corrective labor with property liability. As an example, one could point to the act provided in Article 156³ of the RSFSR Criminal Code and the widespread nature of which we would not doubt, and usually linked to the sale of goods in violation of the established trade procedures in the state and cooperative network.

It must be said that within the discussion concerning the legal reform, certain specialists have made the proposal to completely decriminalize this act, that is, to completely exclude it from the list of the criminally punishable.

As one of the reasons for the proposed decriminalization, they point to the circumstance that the given norm

is virtually not applied by the law enforcement bodies. However, we would argue that the reason here lies not in the fact that the law is bad, but rather, on the contrary, it has been socially caused. The reason lies in the weak use of the law. And again it must be emphasized that the main impediment in the successful struggle against violations of the trade rules is the passivity of the citizens who do not inform the law enforcement bodies of these. And the latter do not make sufficient use of the existing reserves for effective preventive work.

The underestimation of the social significance of penalties for the violation of trade rules, we feel, is premature. Certainly, the legislator is resorting here to so-called dual prevention in establishing liability for acts the thwarting of which by criminal law means would provide an additional preventive effect and thus contribute to the prevention of other, more severe crimes. Let us not forget that the concealed goods often are turned over to persons who "make a living" off their reselling. The disclosure of violations in trade and ensuring the inevitability of punishment for persons committing them, while not completely blocking off the "feeders" for the speculators, at least make the purchasing of speculative items more difficult. Not the cancellation but, let us repeat, a change in the existing sanctions and increased property liability, in our view, would better conform to the interests of society.

It would be unpromising to try to achieve positive results by measures of just law enforcement activities and the criminal law struggle against crimes fostered by the commodity shortage. At best, this would make it possible only temporarily to somewhat neutralize and not eradicate its criminogenic potential. Here there must be profound social reforms and enormous efforts directed at improving the nation's economy and satisfying the growing demand of the population for consumer goods.

A successful combating of crime requires that the legislation more fully consider the feasible changes in the socioeconomic sphere. Clearly, any act of decriminalization or criminalization of any category of acts should be preceded by an extensive study of public opinion. Undoubtedly, "we must consistently adhere to that principle that the criminal law is, so to speak, the last line of defense for society against encroachments on the vitally important conditions of its existence" [2]. And this means that in selecting the specific methods and forms of work to instill law and order, it is important to rely on a precise knowledge of social realities.

Footnotes

1. The research (Moscow, 1988) covered a total of 500 persons and considered the evidence of 250 purchasers of goods from speculators. The poll was conducted by the audience questionnaire method; the evidence in the materials of the criminal cases was studied following a specially worked-out questionnaire.

2. Here and below, where the total result surpasses 100 percent, the respondents could mark several proposed positions.

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Production Strikes as an Object of Sociological Analysis

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[Article by Valentin Nikolayevich Shalenko, candidate of philosophical sciences and docent on the Sociological Faculty of Moscow State University. This is the first time he appears in our journal]

[Text] Soviet social sciences only quite recently have become fully concerned with the problems related to strikes, as can be seen, for example, from the first scientific discussion of the question "Strikes in the USSR: A New Social Reality" [1, pp 21-36]. For an extended period, the official theory rejected the existence of acute social clashes under socialism while the propaganda asserted that our nation lived in a world of social harmony.

The development of socioproduction practice has repudiated this ideological myth which was a reflection of the vulgarization of the ideas of scientific socialism. As is known, regardless of the ferocious terror, the arrests and dismissals, strikes occurred at enterprises right up to the beginning of the 1930s. The 1923 Trade Union Bylaws provided the right to strike. Even I.V. Stalin in 1928 allowed the possibility of strikes as a means for fighting against the bureaucratic distortions of the economic apparatus. Only the process of forced industrialization at the beginning of the 1930s leading to the curtailment of democratic principles in production life marked an end to the open forms of the struggle of the workers for their rights. Now, when the extremely abrupt mass actions of worker protest arose, they were decisively suppressed, as was the case in Novocherkassk in 1962 and the information on the events was classified.

Under these conditions, production and social conflicts appeared in distorted forms. This social phenomenon was reflected in numerous concrete studies of Soviet industrial sociologists in the 1960s and 1970s. To the unsatisfactory working conditions and the organization of labor, the leveling wages, and the technocratic command style of management, the workers responded by lowering labor productivity and the quality of labor, by violations of labor discipline and by a general decline in

labor morality on the job. Worker turnover in the mass professions became a chronic illness of Soviet industry.

During the past years of perestroika full of open actions of mass worker struggle for their interests, a standard approach toward strikes as a social process still had not been defined. Many party and economic leaders, lawyers, economists and journalists feel that production strikes are anomalous phenomena and they are inadmissible as a consequence of the significant harm done to the economy, and they play the role of an inhibiting factor and exacerbate social tension in the nation. All the more as the very concept of a "strike" up to now has been excluded from Soviet legal documents which prefer using euphemisms (work halts, labor disputes and so forth).

In the course of the scientific discussion underway at present, two approaches have emerged to defining the concept of a "strike." According to the first view, a strike would be any halting of socially regulated activity caused by an external reason or by internal resistance of the principals of this activity. While under capitalism a strike serves as a mighty weapon for the proletariat in its class struggle, under the socialist system it performs the function of the struggle against bureaucratic deformations in production management and has primarily an antibureaucratic and not an antistate nature. In this regard, we can agree with the opinion of the Yugoslav sociologist D. Markovic that under socialism "the stopping of work must be understood as an expression of social contradictions...in the system of socialist self-management" [2, p 594].

The other view proceeds from the notion that social protest by workers on the job need not always come down to strikes; there are also various covert forms for resisting actions by the economic administration which are unjust from the viewpoint of the rank-and-file workers. Thus, under the conditions of the dominance of a leveling system for material remuneration, workers claim wages in accord with the rate category regardless of the end product of the labor. Engineers expect a stable salary for daily attendance on the job. In this situation, a conscious protest, as a rule, in the form of quitting is most probable only in losing various privileges for obtaining "unearned wages."

We feel that a strike is one of the most acute forms for manifesting a conflict situation in the sphere of social production. It can be defined as a group, organized, overt (in contrast to sabotage) and effective action against the production process by the temporary refusal by the social principal to participate in regulated labor activity in the aim of satisfying the demands made by them on the management bodies. The principal of the strike can be a certain group of workers, the collective of any structural subdivision or the enterprise as a whole, a group of enterprises in a given city or region.

Soviet labor sociology usually isolates the following reasons for the occurrence of acute conflict situations in

the labor collectives: production-technological, ecological, organizational-managerial and sociopsychological. However, if the given classification "works" on the enterprise level, this cannot be said about the regional or sectorial conflicts. For here there come into action socioeconomic and political factors for the influence of the worker production strikes on social life as a whole.

For this reason, the sociological study of strikes assumes consideration of a whole series of characteristics in conflict situations. In the first place, establishing what is the production and economic situation of the striking collective as the transition to the new management

conditions has often been accompanied by a decline in the wage level for individual employee groups, by increased labor intensity and by greater demands from the management. The modernizing of production equipment can lead to similar consequences.

Secondly, there must also be an analysis of the demands made by the strikers. An analysis of materials from the newspapers SHAKHTERSKAYA PRAVDA, V BOY ZA UGOL and KUZBASS and the protocols of demands by the Kuzbass miners to the USSR Minister of Coal Industry has made it possible for us to draw up a ranked list of problems raised (Table 1).

Table 1. Basic Demands Made by Kuzbass Miners in Course of Strikes in July 1989

List of Demands	Importance of Demands for Strikers (Ranking) in Terms of the Number of Times Mentioned
Granting complete economic independence to enterprises, halting dictating of terms by ministry	I
Reducing coal prices in accord with actual mining costs	II
Removing economic, party and soviet leaders who do not have trust of population	III
Extending political democratization of society, adoption of laws raising social protection of workers	IV
Improving wages, pension coverage and calculating underground working time	V-VII
Solving ecological problems. Environmental conservation measures	VIII
Strengthening physical plant of local soviets	IX
Development of construction industry in region's town	X
Providing benefits for workers under conditions of the Far North and equivalent regions	XI

The data indicate that the miner strikes were a reaction to the extremely unsatisfactory pace of economic reform. The largely still surviving bureaucratic dictating of terms by the central departments impedes a rise in the standard of living of the miners and a radical improvement in the state of the sociodomestic sphere of the collectives and hinders the great potential opportunities of the local authorities for solving ecological and urban problems. The immediate opponent in the production strikes of the miners was a group of party-state and economic leaders of varying rank who had lost their authority in the eyes of the public by their undemocratic and inhuman approach to the needs of ordinary citizens. Precisely the objective democratic and humanistic sense of the miners' struggle for economic and social justice, in going far beyond the limits of the initial, narrowly utilitarian demands of the miners, ensured their virtual ubiquitous support from the entire working-age population of the region's towns and settlements.

According to the data of A.K. Nazimova, the main reasons for the strikes have been ranked in diminishing order: unsatisfactory wages, poor organization of labor, harmful or heavy working conditions, undemocratic managerial methods and an inadmissibly slow pace of perestroyka at the enterprises [3, pp 75-80].

A sociologist must have information on the relationship of the goals and the means of achieving them in the concrete actions of the strikers. Here there are several aspects of analysis. How adequate are the practical means to the declared goals? What is the relationship of peaceful and nonpeaceful, legitimate and illegal means in the strike process? An answer to the last question is essential for assessing the acuteness and the social danger of one or another strike.

To the honor of the miners it must be pointed out that during the July strike in the towns and settlements of the regions, in the opinion of the local internal affairs bodies, there was virtually exemplary public order. However, the lack of social protection for the poorly-off strata of the population, the bureaucratic tyranny and chronic shortage of consumer goods could lead to the prevailing of violent means over peaceful ones and to the development of a relatively organized strike into mass spontaneous disorders and pogroms.

The fourth group of social characteristics of the strikes includes various forms of organization in the course of preparing and carrying out the production strikes. The striking miners of the Kuzbass and Donbass, Vorkuta and Inta were led by strike committees elected democratically. As for whom was supported by the trade union

and party organization of the mines, the workers or the management, here the picture was more contradictory. Virtually all the party committees and mine committees took the side of the strikers. The rayon and city party committees and the soviets supported by the CPSU obkom condemned the strikes and participation in them by communists who headed individual strike committees. Subsequently, for example, the Kemerovo Party Obkom annulled this decision.

In the fifth group of basic parameters of the strike, as the most acute stage of a production conflict situation, are the scale of involvement, the duration, the methods of resolving and the aggregate effect of the held strike. The data given in Table 2 provide a notion of the scale of the strikes in the Kuzbass.

Table 2. Dynamics of Strikes in Kemerovo Oblast in July 1989*

Day of Month	Number of Nonoperating Enterprises	Number of Striking Workers (Persons)
10	1	334
11	10	15,900
12	96	26,710
13	107	47,010
14	61	57,710
15	134	111,125
16	146	140,310
17	158	177,682
18	137	150,610
19	91	64,015
20	35	33,690
21	All oblast enterprises operating	

* Source: POLITICHESKOYE SAMOOBRAZOVANIYE, No 13, 1989, p 54.

Other units of measurement can be employed for the scale of one or another strike: brigade, shop or several shops and enterprise.

Among the basic methods for resolving the production conflicts are concessions by the management, by the workers, compromise agreements and sanctions against the organizers. The advisability of applying each of these means depends upon the actions and intentions of the opposing sides, including, the categoricalness and feasibility of carrying out the raised demands, the balance of goal and means, peaceful and violent forms of struggle, the material damage caused by the strike to the national economy and to the workers themselves.

The last indicator is particularly important. The disruption of the key sectors of the national economy, of course, causes serious material harm to the renewal of our society. Just in the first half of 1989, because of strikes we did not produce a total of around 200 million rubles worth of product. Including during the strike in the Kuzbass and Donbass, the coal losses were over 5

million tons; product valued at almost 150 million rubles was not produced. The interests of the strikers also suffered as the economic incentive funds declined and much greater effort was needed to recover from the losses.

In this context there is the urgent question of recognizing the admissibility of strikes as a form for the workers to defend their rights and interests. Since a strike is an extreme means, it must be reinforced legislatively in the USSR Constitution. I feel it essential to introduce a concept of the "social purposefulness" of a strike. As the components in it, it is possible to include the following indicators:

1. Does the enterprise where the strike occurs operate at a profit or a loss.
2. The degree of the economic and legal validity of the striker demands.
3. The balance of the goals and the means of achieving them, the peaceful and violent actions of the participants in the conflict in the course of the strike.
4. The degree of organization of the strike process and leadership by the strike committees and authoritative leaders.
5. The position of the party and trade union organizations in the labor collective concerning the strike—support or condemnation.
6. The quantitative scale and duration of the strike.
7. The acceptance for the opposing parties of specific methods for resolving the acute conflict situation.
8. The integral effect of the occurring strike: for the national economy, the enterprise, the worker and the area of his residence. The social, material and moral harm.

Assessing the "social purposefulness" of a strike is closely linked to assessing the prospects for its effective resolution. As a sociologist, I am against the universalization of strikes at present. This erroneous approach must be opposed by using other means of the workers' sociopolitical and ideological struggle for their rights. These can include direct contacts of democratically thinking worker leaders with the people's deputies, the aid to the former in their desire to join new councils on the spot, providing an opportunity for them to have their say on the pages of newspapers and establishing a permanently operating "Parliamentary Channel" on Central and local television. In other words, a strike must be viewed as a useful social tool for the workers precisely in the system of measures to struggle for accelerating the democratization of Soviet society. At the same time, there must be the theoretical elaboration of mechanisms for preventing conflicts, for assessing the social significance of the strikes and methods for sociological support of managerial decisions in the aim of regulating the strike movement.

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